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Today' s copyright concerns often center on the new digital
technologies, especially the Internet and its friendly interface, the World
Wide Web ("the Internet"). Even though the Internet is relatively new and
poses new challenges for copyright law, "technology," as such, and a
constant change in technology are certainly not new. To the contrary,
inventors, innovators, and entrepreneurs have been changing the landscape
of American life ever since the country's founding. Not surprisingly,
copyright law-having existed for almost as long1-has repeatedly had to
accommodate new technologies over the two centuries of its existence.
Congress has repeatedly stated its intention to make the Copyright Ace
flexible enough to adapt to new technologies over time without requiring
repeated amendments. Much of the talk in hearings for the 1909 Copyright

1. The first Copyright Act was enacted in 1790. See generally Act of May 31, 1790,
ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
2. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at
17 u.s.c. §§ 101-118 (1976)).
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Ace focused on this goal, and even more of the hearings for the 1976
Copyright Act4 focused on it as well. Yet, since its effective date of 1978, the
most recent major copyright revision has been amended at least twenty-eight
times, 5 more than once every year on average, and as of this writing, has just
undergone some very significant amendments relating to new technology. 6
Something is out of kilter here. On the one hand, Congress has tried to
make the Copyright Act flexible enough to survive technological change; on
the other hand, every new technological change seems to lead to further
amendments to the Copyright Act. Why is it so hard to make the Copyright
Act flexible, particularly when Congress has declared that doing so is a
signal value?
Two reasons account for the failure of Congress to craft an enduring
Copyright Act, though only the second of these is addressed here. The first
reason is essentially a matter of politics: a Copyright Act written to survive
significant technological change would necessarily be very broadly and
generally worded. But broad and general language neither clearly requires
the imposition of liability nor clearly renders a potential defendant immune
3. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended at
17 u.s.c. §§ 101-914 (1994)).
4. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §
101 (1994)).
5. See Preface to the Copyright Act <http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/
title17/preface.html> (the U.S. Copyright Office World Wide Web site). See also H.R. REP.
No. 104-554, at 6 (1996) (stating "[s]ince 1976, Congress. regularly has had to address new
issues, especially those raised by new technologies or new methods of exploitation. Each
session of Congress has produced at least one major amendment to the Copyright Act").
6. See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ["DMCA"], H.R. 2281, 105th Cong.
(1998), signed into law by President William Clinton in the fall of 1998 as Pub. L. No. 105304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. 101). The Copyright Office
summarized the law as follows:
The DMCA is divided into five titles:
Title I ... implements the WIPO treaties.
Title II ... creates limitations on the liability of online service providers for
copyright infringement when engaging in certain types of activities.
Title III ... creates an exemption for making a copy of a computer program
by activating a computer for purposes of maintenance or repair.
Title IV contains six miscellaneous provisious, relating to the functions of
the Copyright Office, distance education, the exceptions in the Copyright Act
for libraries and for making ephemeral recordings, "webcasting" of sound
recordings on the Internet, and the applicability of collective bargaining
agreement obligations in the case of transfers of rights in motion pictures.
Title V ... creates a new form of protection for the design of vessel hulls.
U.S. Copyright Office, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office
Summary <http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyrightllegislation/dmca.pdf> (emphasis in original).
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from liability in a given context. Political interest groups therefore seek
legislative provisions not only favorable to their interests, but provisions that
clearly and unambiguously favor those interests. To accomplish the latter
goal, those groups press Congress for narrow and specific statutory wording,
wording that cannot be expected to survive much technological
change. Conversely, the more general the language of an act-and hence the
more likely that it is to survive a long while-the greater the incentive of
•
• 7
mterest groups to oppose 1t.
The second reason for Congress's failure is a matter of policy, however,
and is within the scope of this article: Congress has perceived and hence
tried to solve only one-fourth of the problem of copyright and new
technologies-the other three-fourths have never been adequately addressed,
let alone solved. The one-fourth of the problem that has been reasonably
well solved is the issue of copyright's subject matter. At times, new
technologies create new media for recording the creative expression of
authors, such as photography, motion pictures, laser-etched disks, and so
on. This kind of technological evolution has often in the past given rise to
the corresponding issue of whether those new media should be protected by
copyright. By and large, the 1976 Copyright Act avoided the questionsand the need for repeated Copyright Act amendments-for future media by
defining copyright's subject matter to be "works of authorship", something
that is by definition an abstraction and independent of any particular medium
of fixation. The three-fourths of the problem that has not been addressed
makes up an enormous portion of the .issues that surround new technology
and copyright. Those issues, first proposed in a report written for the United
8
States Copyright Office, include the following.
7. For more on the politics of copyright revision, see Professor Litman's excellent
analysis in Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv.
275, 277 (1989), written 10 years ago and more timely than ever:
Throughout its history, copyright law has had difficulty accommodating
technological change. Although the substance of copyright legislation in this
century has evolved from meetings among industry representatives whose
avowed purpose was to draft legislation that provided for the future, the
resulting statutes have done so poorly. The language of copyright statutes has
been
phrased
in
fact-specific
language
that
has
grown
obsolete . . . . Whatever copyright statute has been on the books has been
routinely, and justifiably, criticized as outmoded. In this article, I suggest that
the nature of the legislative process we have relied on for copyright revision
is largely to blame for those laws' deficiencies.
!d. at 277 (citations omitted).
8. I. TROTIER HARDY, PROJECT LoOKING FORWARD: SKETCHING THE FuTuRE OF
COPYRIGHT IN A NETWORKED WORlD-FINAL REPORT 238 {1998) [hereinafter HARDY I] (source
on file with author).
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New subject matter. First, new technologies sometimes allow new
forms of creative expression that are independent of any particular
medium. 9 These new forms of expression raise questions of copyright's
subject matter that are not solved by the current Copyright Act's separation
of copyrightable "works" from particular media because the issue has
nothing to do with the particular medium of fixation. 1° For example, the
hierarchy of menu commands that is part of many computer programs is a
form of expression that can be fixed in a variety of media. 11 Yet, in early
1996 the Supreme Court split four-to-four on the question of the
copyrightability of menu command hierarchies. 12
Decentralized infringement. Second, technologies like photocopying
and computers sometimes allow widespread noncommercial uses of
copyrighted works in ways that would clearly be infringing if done on a large
scale for commercial purposes. 13 When they are done on a small scale,
typically for noncommercial purposes, the issue arises whether these
"decentralized infringements" should be legitimized as a fair use, considered
to be infringements even if they are largely undetectable by copyright
owners, declared to be non-infringing by Congress, or dealt with in some
other way. 14
New uses. Finally, new technologies often create new ways of using
existing copyrighted works. 15 Radio in the early 1920s raised the issue
whether music broadcasts infringed composers' performance rights, for
example. 16 Cable television in the 1960s similarly raised the issue whether
retransmitting copyrighted television programs or movies infringed the
copyright owner's performance rights. 17
This article will summarize these three issues of copyright and new
technologies, and then concentrate on the last, the "new-use" issue from the
perspective of copyright as an incentive to creative efforts. The article will
demonstrate that much of the affected parties' and Congress's understanding
of the new-use issue is faulty because it is heavily biased toward the then
present state of the technology in issue. A proper analysis of the issue
requires thinking ahead. Some new-use technologies will eventually grow to
supplant "old use" technologies and should therefore be required to pay
9. /d. at 238.
10. !d.
11. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an
equally divided court 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
12. !d. See also infra text accompanying notes 31-34.
13. HARDY I, supra note 8, at 240.
14. !d. at 241.
15. !d. at 240.
16. /d.
17. !d.
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royalties to preserve authors' incentives at their previous level. Other newuse technologies may not grow to any particular importance, and
consequently need not be required to pay royalties to preserve authors'
incentives. Unfortunately, neither courts nor Congress can predict the future
growth of a new technology in order to make this determination. The issue
is then how to make a determination about a new-use technology's royalty
obligation that depends on foretelling the future when the future cannot be
foretold.
This article proposes one answer to this apparently intractable problem
by analyzing the issue in terms of the statistician's ''Typer· and ''Type ll''
errors. Essentially, this approach asks: "How bad could it be" if the
copyright decision-maker (court or Congress) guesses wrongly about a new
technology's future? If one type of wrong guess is likely to be less harmful
than other types, than absent information to the contrary, that is the guess
about the future that the decision-maker ought to make. Finally, this same
analysis implies that in the absence of other information to the contrary,
when courts or Congress face the issue of whether a copyright royalty
obligation applies to a new-use technology, they should fmd that it does
apply.
I. NEW MEDIA AS SUBJECf MATIER

The way we view copyright's "subject matter" has evolved over the two
centuries of copyright law's existence. In 1790, the first copyright statute
included "maps, charts, and books" within its protection. 18 Although not
expressly confined to tangible media-a court could always interpret "map"
or "chart" or "book" in a broad and nonliteral way were the occasion to do
so arise19-this statute nonetheless seemed to focus on tangible media as the
object of copyright's protection.
Over the succeeding two hundred years, the focus of copyright's subject
became more varied, including some subject matters defined or phrased as
tangible objects, and others suggesting more abstract types of works. In an
1853 case, for example, the Supreme Court said clearly that copyright was
an abstract right, thoroughly separate from any tangible embodiment:
But from the consideration we have given to the case, we are
satisfied that the property acquired by the sale in the engraved
plate, and the copy-right of the map secured to the author under the
18. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
19. See Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 89 (1899) (stating "the word 'book' as used in
the statute is not to be understood in its technical sense of a bound volume, but any species of
publication which the author selects to embody his literary product").
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act of Congress, are altogether different and independent of each
other, and have no necessary connection. The copy-right is an
exclusive right to the multiplication of the copies, for the benefit of
the author or his assigns, disconnected from the plate, or any other
physical existence. It is an incorporeal right to print and publish
the map, or, as said by Lord Mansfield in Millar v. Taylor (4
Burr. 2396) "a property in notion, and has no corporeal tangible
substance." 20

Yet when Congress added photography to copyright's subject matter in
1865, it used words that focused on the medium itself: protection applied to
"photographic prints."21 On the other hand, musical compositions were for
22
years registered by the Copyright Office in the category of "books," a
practice that implied a recognition of "music" as a more abstract entity,
capable of being fixed in a variety of forms. Congress only exwessly added
"musical compositions" to copyright's subject matter in 1831. "Dramatic
24
works" were added to the statute as a category in 1856, another phrase
suggesting a focus on the abstract work regardless of its medium of
fixation. Yet, this abstract sounding focus was not so broad that it was
thought expressly to include "o:Eeratic compositions," a subject matter only
added to the statute in 1894.
Moreover, in 1908 the Supreme Court
declared without reservation that copyright's subject matter consisted only
of tangible media:

20. Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. 528,530 (1852).
21. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540. Interestingly, the issue of photography
as a new type of copyrightable subject matter was litigated a year later, in 1866, on facts that
had arisen before passage of the 1865 Act. See Wood v. Abbott, 30 F. Cas. 424, 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 17,938). The court concluded that photographs did not fit within any of
the existing categories of protectible subject matter and hence were not copyrightable. /d.
22. See Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents,
60th Cong. (1908) (statement of Albert H. Walker), reprinted in E. FULTON BRYLAWSKI &
ABE GolDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHf Acr (1976) [hereinafter
BRYLAWSKI] Part K at 46 (noting that English courts had protected sheet music as "books"
since 1777, and that American courts had always followed that precedent).
23. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16,4 Stat. 436.
24. See Act of Aug. 18, 1956, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (1856).
25. See H.R. 6835, 53d Cong. § 4966 (1894). Apparently Congress omitted "operatic
compositions" from the category of "dramatic works" from simple oversight. See JAMES W.
COVERT, AMENDING THE COPYRIGHf LAW, H.R. REP. No. 1191, at 1 (stating "the omission to
include protective provisions for operatic compositions in the law sought to be amended [in
1856] was, doubtless, the result of oversight").
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The statute has not provided for the protection of the intellectual
conception apart from the thing produced, however meritorious
such conception may be, but has provided for the making and filing
of a tangible thing, against the publication and duplication of which
26
it is the purpose of the statute to protect ....

Finally, in the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress formally adopted the
"meritorious conception" that was rejected sixty-eight years earlier by the
Supreme Court, namely that copyright's subject matter is abstract "works of
authorship" regardless of the medium of a work's flxation. 27
By
"generalizing" copyright's subject matter that way, Congress hoped to
permit copyright law more gracefully to accommodate technological
change-to apply to new media of fixation, whether "now known or later
developed."28 Relative to other issues of copyright and new technology,
Congress has succeeded reasonably well in that endeavor?9 To the author's
knowledge, no issues of copyright subject matter have arisen over "video
26. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908). Apparently
contra is the ten-years' earlier opinion in Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 89 (1899) (stating:
''It is the intellectual production of the author which the copyright protects and not the
particular form which such production ultimately takes" though the Court may have intended
"form" to refer to some form of paper publication).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
28. !d.
29. But see HARDY I, supra note 8, at 246 stating:
Even under the 1976 Act, subject matter issues that spring from new media of
fixation have not always been resolved as cleanly and simply as the statutory
language suggests. Notably in the 1980's, it took a major, highly contested
case, Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corporation, [714 F.2d 1240
(3rd Cir. 1983)], to determine that although computer programs written on
paper or on a disk were the subject matter of copyright, so were computer
programs fixed in read-only memory. One would have thought that the
"medium-neutral" design of the 1976 Act would have made this an easy
answer to reach.
Id. See also Matthew Bender & Co., v. West Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998), where
despite its claims to the contrary, the Second Circuit returned to putting copyright's subject
matter focus on the particular medium of fixation instead of the abstract work that results from
"selection and arrangement." Id. at 703.
But the relevant statutory wording refers to material objects in which "a
work" readable by technology "is fixed," not to another work or works that
can be created, unbidden, by using technology to alter the fixed embedding of
the work, by rearrangement or otherwise. The natural reading of the statute is
that the arrangement of the work is the one that can be perceived by a
machine without an uninvited manipulation of the data.
/d.
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cassettes," "audio CDs," "CD-ROMs," "laser disks," "DVD disks," "DIVX
videos," three-dimensional photographs in holograms, or over any other
modern developments in media technology. That such disputes have not
arisen is a tribute to Congress's wisdom in abstracting copyright's subject
matter away from the medium of fixation.
II. NEW WORKS AS SUBJECf MATIER

Tributes pretty much have to stop with Congress's handling of the
medium-of-fixation issue, alas. Less successfully treated in the Copyright
Act is the issue of whether new types of works should be treated as
copyrightable subject matter.30 The First Circuit's decision in Lotus
Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc}' a case involving the
question of extending protection to the menu command structure of a
computer program, illustrates the problem.32
Lotus had developed the widely used computer spreadsheet program
known as "Lotus 1-2-3."
Lotus 1-2-3 is a spreadsheet program that enables users to perform
accounting functions electronically on a computer. Users
manipulate and control the program via a series of menu
commands, such as "Copy," "Print," and "Quit." Users choose
commands either by highlighting them on the screen or by typing
their first letter. In all, Lotus 1-2-3 has 469 commands arranged
into more than 50 menus and submenus?3

Competing software company Borland developed its own spreadsheet
program, "Quattro," which could make use of the same menu commandsindeed, Quattro had implemented '"a virtually identical copy of the entire 12-3 menu tree"' though with a different on-screen appearance. 34 Lotus sued
Borland, arguing that Borland had infringed Lotus's copyright in hierarchy

30.
31.
(1996).
32.
33.
34.
(D. Mass.

17 u.s.c. § 103 (1994).
49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affinned by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233
!d. at 810.
!d. at 809.
!d. at 810 (quoting Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 202, 212
1993) (emphasis in original)).
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of menu commands. The First Circuit concluded that the menu hierarchy
was a "method of operation"-something not copyrightable by defmition. 35
A more useful way of looking at the case, though, is to see it as an issue
of new subject matter. Personal computers and the software sold for them
constituted a new technology that led to a new type of authorial effort, the
creation of a computer program's "menu hierarchy." The fundamental issue
in the case was whether copyright law should recognize that type of
authorship as an appropriate type of subject matter for protection.36
The issue arises because of ambiguity in the statutory
language. Section 102 defmes tWo things: things that copyright protects as
subject matter, and things that copyright does not protect as subject
37
matter. These twin provisions, intended no doubt to serve as an abundance
of caution in ensuring that the Copyright Act withholds copyright protection
from ideas, facts, and the like, actually open up a middle ground of
uncertainty. If there were but a single defmition of what is copyright's
subject matter, courts would focus on new types of works with but a single
question: Does this type of work fall within that definition of subject
matter? With two defmitions, one inclusive and one exclusive, the Lotus
court understandably felt obliged to ask three questions: Does the new type
of work fall within the definition of copyrightable subject matter? Does the
work also fall within the definition of non-copyrightable subject
matter? And fmally, what is the effect of a work's falling within both
categories of expressly protected and expressly unprotected subject matter?
Lotus apparently concluded that a computer program's menu hierarchy did in
fact fall within both categories:
[W]hile original expression is necessary for copyright protection
[that is, falls within copyright's included subject matter], we do not
think that it is alone sufficient. Courts must still inquire whether
original expression falls within one of the categories foreclosed
from copyright protection by [section] 102(b) [that is, falls within
copyright's excluded subject matter], such as being a "method of
38
operation."

35. /d. at 815. The Copyright Act, section 102(b), notes: "'In no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any ... method of operation."' Lotus,
49 F.3d at 815 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994)).
36. /d. at 813.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1994).
38. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 818.
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The court implicitly found that falling within both categories meant that the
new type of work, menu command hierarchies, was not eligible for
copyngh'
t s protect10n. 39
0

0

ill. THE "DECENTRALIZED INFRINGEMENT" ISSUE

One major problem in copyright enforcement today is the fact that
many modem communications technologies exhibit very low reproduction
costs. Low costs mean that small firms, or even individuals, can make low
volume copies without coming to the attention of copyright holders. When
copying costs are high, infringement tends to be "centralized" because
economies of scale dictate that a business enterprise-a store, a copy
center-provide the copying equipment. Business enterprises are few
enough in number, and visible enough through advertising, that copyright
holders can locate and bargain with them.
Before the invention of mimeography and xerography, for example, the
copying of books or other printed matter would have to be undertaken by
hand, a severe practical limit, or by a printer. Printing required typesetting,
an expensive and time-consuming process. Because of the high initial
overhead of printing, copying would not be worth undertaking unless a fairly
large run of books was envisioned. A large run of books by a commercial
printer would constitute a "centralized" infringement and would be relatively
visible to a copyright holder:
The unauthorized publication of a copyrighted book may ordinarily
be adequately punished through civil proceedings and under the
provisions of existing law. The offender in such case is ordinarily
a person of fixed habitat, and has a press and the implements of his
business. The ordinary processes of the courts may readily be
served upon him, and he may be compelled to respond in damages
. wrongd omg.40
fior h IS
0

When technology reduces the costs of copying, the phenomenon of
"decentralized infringement" results: individuals can duplicate copyrighted
works in a way that is not easily detected by the copyright holder. Today,
high quality copies can be made in low volume by ubiquitous photocopy
machines. Such copying takes no overhead, little time, and even the
machinery is priced low enough for home use, where the copying is
essentially invisible to a copyright holder.

39. /d.at819.
40. See COVERT, supra note 25, at 2.
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The photocopier and the video recorder are obvious examples of
dramatically lowered costs over printing presses and television studios for
the making of copies of paper documents and television
programs. Similarly, the falling cost of home audio taping equipment in the
form of tape cassettes during the 1960s and 1970s allowed individuals to
make high quality copies of sound recordings that previously could only be
made with expensive reel-to-reel tape machines in professional sound
studios. Making such copies was lawful under federal law until1972.41
Decentralized infringement is not confmed to physical reproduction of
copyrighted materials. The distribution right42 can also be affected by
technology. Today's computer networks and electronic mail provide an easy
way to distribute information to literally millions of Internet users. In spite
of recent amendments to the Copyright Act43 to deal with digitized music,
new developments in digital audio and the Internet raise the familiar issue of
decentralized infringement once again.
Music has been available in a digital format in the form of audio
"compact disks" or "CDs" for many years.44 For some years, it was far from
easy for home users to make a copy of the digital audio data resident on a
CD. CD players and computers with CD-ROM drives converted the digital
format to analog immediately upon use. Consequently, home audio taping
equipment that was used to copy a CD produced an analog tape recording,
one that would decline in quality with multiple generations of subsequent
copies. Both home audio equipment and computer CD-ROM drives today,
however, are commonly able to copy the digital format directly, without
conversion to analog form. Readily available software can read the digital
files from a CD and copy them onto a personal computer's hard disk.45
41. See Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §
l(f)); see also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (discussing California's state-law
approach to the problem).
42. The Copyright Act confers several defined rights on copyright owners:
reproduction, distribution, public performance, public display, and the preparation of
derivative works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
43. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994) (codifying the Audio Home Recording Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4327 (1992)).
44. The Philips Corporation introduced the first CD system in 1979. Sony followed
with improvements to the Philips design in 1983. RUSSEU. SANJEK & DAVID SANJEK,
AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC BUSINESS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 241 (1991).
45. See, e.g., Audiograbber <http://www.audiograbber.com-us.net> (stating:
Audiograbber is a beautiful piece of software that grabs digital audio
from cd's. It copies the audio digitally- not through the soundcard- which
enables you to make perfect copies of the originals. It can even perform a test
to see that the copies really are perfect. Audiograbber can also automatically
normalize the music, delete silence from the start and/or end of tracks ....).
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However, the resulting computer files are quite large. 46 For most home
users, wide-spread distribution of such files electronically over the Internet
would be impracticably time consuming.47 However, a compression
technology called "MP3" has arisen that reduces the sizes of such files by a
factor of ten, with little or no noticeable loss in music quality.48 This
combination of copying and compression technologies has resulted in the
rapid spread of nonprofessional Internet sites that feature digitized music for
downloading, typically copied from CDs.49 This development now threatens
to decentralize the formerly highly centralized system for the distribution of
50
recorded music.
46. CD music occupies roughly 10 million bytes of computer storage per minute of
playing time. A three minute song, for example, copied to one's computer hard disk would
take up roughly 30 megabytes of disk storage.
47. A typical home-to-Internet connection today operates at 28.8 kilobits per
second. At that speed, downloading or uploading a three-minute song, about 30 million bytes
(which at eight bits per byte equals 240 million bits), would take roughly 140 minutes or over
two hours (that is 240 million bits divided by 28,800 bits per second which equals 8333
seconds). Obviously, anything that speeded up such downloading-other things being
equal-would increase the amount of such downloading. Faster modems or other access
technologies would do it; smaller file sizes would also do it. It happens that the latter came
first.
48. See Jason Chervokas, Music Industry Fears Digital Music Pirates
<http://search.nytimes.com/books/search/bin/fastweb?getdoc+cyber-lib+cyberlib+20671 +3+w
AAA+mp3> (source on file with author). See also David Thorn, MPEG Audio FAQ Version
9 <http://www.tnt.uni-hannover.de/project/mpeg/audio/faq/> (source on file with author).
49. The Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") refers to these nonprofessional sites as "Music Archive Sites," defining them as sites that
host an inventory of full-length sound recordings for Internet users to
download and play and in some cases upload as well. Music Archive Sites
may contain hundreds of full-length sound recordings that, for the most part,
are of near CD quality. The sites often actively encourage -- sometimes
require-- users to upload additional full-length sound recordings to the site in
exchange for being able to download.
RIAA, Record Industry Protects Copyrighted Sound Recordings On the Internet:
Enforcement Campaign Expands, Music Archive Sites Targeted <http://www.riaa.com/
antipir/releases/maslit.htm>.
50. See, e.g., Jon Pareles, With A Click, A New Era of Music Dawns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
15, 1998, at AR-1 (stating: "Digital distribution is likely to revolutionize the economics of the
music business. Some advantages of large recording companies, like their centralized
manufacturing and distribution and their domination of retail display space, vanish if the
Internet becomes the main outlet for music") (emphasis added). These new music distribution
technologies have strong analogies to jukeboxes, radio, retail CD stores, and so on, suggesting
that courts will find that distributing music in this particular form will be infringing. Yet, on
October 26, 1998, federal district court Judge Audrey B. Collins denied the recording
industry's motion for a preliminary injunction against the sale of a device for storing music in
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These previous illustrations feature changing costs making certain uses
of works so cheap that they are no longer centralized and hence no longer
"visible" or readily controllable by copyright owners. This phenomenon can
arise even without sophisticated technology. Early in the twentieth century,
witnesses in copyright hearings testified about the difficulty of rmding and
suing professional play pirates, who operated in this fashion:
An expert stenographer secretes himself somewhere in the theater
and he takes down word for word everything that is spoken in the
play . . . . After he has gotten all that, he takes down the makeup of
the actor, everything he wears, the arrangement of the face, the
beard or wig if he wears one, the costume. Then he comes down to
the scenery; the properties that are used. All of the play is stolen in
that way.

How does he get that stolen manuscript on the market? He does
not put out a sign "Play broker," ''Play agent," as a reputable
vendor of manuscripts would do. But he has in front a beer
saloon. You enter ostensibly to get a glass of beer. What you go
for is to get the play. By knocking on a door or by some other
means you obtain access to the manuscript room, and you get a
51
copy for $5.

Another witness similarly complained about the difficulty of enforcing
play copyrights when unauthorized "performances are usually given at points
remote from the location or headquarters of the dramatic author or producer,
and by irresponsible persons, who jump their companies nightly from town
to town." 52 Obviously, modern digital technology had nothing to do with
these nineteenth to early twentieth century play performances. Rather, the
its MP3 fonnat. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Actions against private individuals for "decentralized
infringement" in the fonn of copying MP3 files may be foreclosed by the digital audio
amendments to the Copyright Act made in 1992. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994).
51. Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 60th
Cong. (1908), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part Kat 22 (statement of Harry P.
Mawson, representing the American Dramatists' Club).
52. /d. at 24 (statement of Ligon Johnson, representing the National Association of
Theatrical Managers). Similarly, the 19th century saw the wide-spread unauthorized
reproduction and distribution of sheet music. Canadian music publishers maintained secret
publishing houses in the United States. They sent thousands of salesmen out with trunks of
sheet music, keeping only a few sheets at recognized warehouses so that they could not be
caught with much on hand. See H.R. REP. No. 1289-55.
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problem grew from the fact that the performances, at least when done with
limited props and scenery, had only small economies of scale and could
therefore be produced with a small number of people and equipment and
hence in a decentralized fashion.
Courts and Congress have responded to the decentralized infringement
issue in a variety of ways. At times, stiff penalties have been imposed on the
conduct; 53 at times, Congress has adopted a compulsory license with
prescribed payments;54 at times, private parties have worked out their own
arrangements in the form of "guidelines;"55 at times, Congress has rendered
the activities immune, perhaps in exchange for a tax/royalty on some related
activity; 56 at times, one who facilitates decentralized infringement has been
found liable for contributory infringement; 57 at times, a court has declared
the activity to be a fair use. 58 And doubtless, at times, the activity in
question continues, undetected, without litigation, and hence without any
definitive resolution of the infringement question.
N. THENEW-USEISSUE

All three problems so far discussed-new media of fixation, new types
of works, and decentralized infringement-raise challenges for copyright
law and merit thoughtful analysis. But the fourth problem is perhaps the
most vexing of all: new technologies that create a new way of using existing
copyrighted works. In short, these technologies raise the new-use question:
Does the new-use of an existing copyrighted work infringe the author's
rights? An abundance of illustrations has emerged from copyright cases
over the last century or so.
For example, musical compositions as such were copyrightable after
1831, well before the advent of radio in the 1920s. When radio stations
began playing musical compositions "on the air," however, litigation soon
arose over whether such a playing constituted a "performance for profit" of
53. See Act of January 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 482 (amending 60 R.S. ch. 3) (imposing
prison sentences for unauthorized play performances).
54. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (compulsory license for the making of "cover records").
55. See Ad Hoc Committee on Copyright Law Revision, Authors League of America,
and Association of American Publishers, Inc., Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom
Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals,
reprinted in HOUSE REPORT ON COPYRIGHf Acr OF 1976, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 159-60,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5775-76 [hereinafter House Report].
56. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003, 1004 (1994) (tax on digital recording devices and media).
57. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 855 F. Supp.
905 (E.D. Mich. 1994), rev'd, 74 F.3d 1512 (6th Cir. 1996), reh'g en bane and opinion
vacated, 74 F.3d 1528 (6th Cir. 1996), aff'd 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
58. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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the composition-and hence a copyright infringement under the 1909
Copyright Act.
The same question arose after the arrival of cable television in the
1960s. Cable television began as a means of strengthening the signal of
distant broadcast stations, especially in the valleys of mountainous
areas. These cable stations picked up broadcast signals from the airwaves
and passed them along to cable subscribers without seeking permission from
the broadcast stations or paying royalties. Again, litigation arose over
whether such retransmission by cable constituted a "public performance for
profit" within the scope of the copyright owner's rights.

A

Phonograph Recording

Composers of the 1900s era wanted to be able to collect royalties from
phonograph and piano roll companies that hired orchestras to record their
compositions. Most copyright scholars know that the Supreme Court
rejected that desire in 1908, when the Court decided the White-Smith Music
Publishing. Co. v. Apollo Co. 59 case. White-Smith held that the use of
copyrighted music on piano rolls, a popular technology of the day, 60 did not
infringe the composer's copyright rights.61 Less well-known, perhaps, is that
the Supreme Court rested its decision partly on that fact that a number of
earlier lower court cases had declined to offer copyright protection to
recorded sound; Congress, with presumed awareness of those decisions, had
62
.
not acted to change that result.
59. 209 u.s. 1 (1908).
60. !d. at 9.
The record discloses that in the year 1902 from seventy to seventy-five
thousand of such instruments were in use in the United States, and that from
one million to one million and a half of such perforated musical rolls ... were
made in this country in that year.
It is evident that the question involved in the use of such rolls is one of
very considerable importance, involving large property interests, and closely
touching the rights of composers and music publishers.

!d.
61. /d. at 18.
62. /d. at 12-14.
[I]t must be admitted that the decisions, so far as brought to our attention in
the full discussion had at the bar and upon the briefs, have been uniformly to
the effect that these perforated rolls operated in connection with mechanical
devices for the production of music are not within the copyright act.
White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 12.
Since these cases were decided Congress has repeatedly had occasion to
amend the copyright law. The English cases, the decision of the District
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The real story was a bit more circular. True, the early cases of recorded
music found no infringement. In 1888, a Massachusetts case, Kennedy
63
v. McTammany, found that the reproduction of music in the form of
perforated paper rolls for "organette" hand organs64 did not infringe
composers' copyrights because it was not a "copy" of the comEosition for
copyright purposes. 65 A similar case in 1901, Stern v. Rosey, 6 relied on
Kennedy to conclude that a phonograph record was similarly not a copy of
the musical composition it recorded. 67 Within just a few years of that
decision, Congress began considering a major revision of the Copyri&ht
Act. By the time the first Congressional hearings began in June, 1906, a
bill had already been introduced that provided music composers the right to
control the reproduction of their works in the form of recorded sounds:
[T]he copyright secured by this Act shall include the sole and
exclusive right ...

(g) To make, sell, distribute, or let for hire any device,
contrivance, or appliance especially adapted in any manner
whatsoever to reproduce to the ear the whole or any material part
of any work published and copyrighted after this Act shall have
gone into effect, or by means of any such device or appliance

Court of Appeals, and Judge Colt's decision must have been well known to
the members of Congress ... the omission of Congress to specifically
legislate concerning them might well be taken to be an acquiescence in the
judicial construction given to the copyright laws.
!d. at 14.
63. 33 F. 584 (C.C.D. Mass. 1888).
64. For a brief history of organettes, see Peter Schmidt, History of Organettes
<http://www.actionwebcreations.com/srnr/history.htm>, where one learns that John
McTammany-presumably the defendant in the case cited-was the inventor of the devices.
!d. Schmidt himself is evidently a collector of antique organettes. !d.
65. Kennedy, 33 F. at 584.
66. 17 App. D.C. 562 (1901).
67. !d. at 565.
68. Three hearings took place: in June of 1906; again in December of that year; and
finally, in March of 1908. See Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint
Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong. (1906), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part Hat 102;
Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong.
(1906), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part J at 276; Revision of Copyright Laws:
Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 60th Cong. (1908), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI,
supra note 22, Part K at 46.
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publicly to reproduce to the ear the whole or any material part of
69
such work ....

The bill proved controversial, with the "authors" (composers and
publishers) favoring it, and "users" (piano roll and phonograph
manufacturers) opposing it. In classic fashion, though, both sides to the
debate focused on the effect of the new technology on the market for the old
technology, without so much as a nod to the possibility that the new
technology might itself become a major market one day. In the case of
recorded sound, the old market was for the sale of sheet music to individuals
and to orchestras and bands for live performances.70 Accordingly, much
testimony centered on sheet music sales: Whether a composer's right to
control the making of recordings would help or hurt the composer's income
from the sale of sheet music.71 As it turned out, in a very few years several
phonograph recording companies would earn phenomenal amounts of money

69. Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 59th
Cong. (1906), reprinted in BRYIAWSKI, supra note 22, Part Hat v (1976).
70. KERRY SEGRAVE, PAYOLA IN TilE MUSIC INDUSTRY: A HISTORY, 1880-1991 3
(1994). ''In those days [the late 19th century], of course, it was the sale of sheet music that
was the sole so~rce of income for the [music publishing] companies •••. Records would not
become a major factor for several more decades." !d.
71. See, e.g., BRYIAWSKI, supra note 22, Part Hat 325 (statement of Paul H. Cromelin,
representing the Columbia Phonograph Company). Mr. Cromelin stated that the operators of
a penny arcade that featured coin operated player pianos:
are being paid by certain music publishers for displaying ads of certain
compositions over the automatic piano or piano player which is used to attract
the public.
It seems to us that this would amply demonstrate the fact that publishers
and composers consider the piano player an advantageous medium to increase
the sale of their compositions.
/d. at 325 (statement of Paul H. Cromelin, representing the Columbia Phonograph Company)
Why does [one of several well known music publishers], who claim that we
are stealing the product of the composers' brains, use .•. us and paying [sic]
for 250 to 300 records of every song as soon as they publish it? For the
purpose of selling the records? No-absolutely not-but to give them away
to the owners of penny arcades in consideration of their putting them on their
automatic graphophones, so that the public will become acquainted with the
tune and buy the sheet music.
ld. at 326. ''We claim, gentlemen, that there has been no more potent influence than the
talking machine and the piano player and these various mechanical devices in bringing about
an increase in sheet music sales of 163 percent in six years." ld. at 333.
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from record sales;72 however, this possibility was remote from the
discussions.
In any event, Congress and various industry representatives continued
to thrash the music issue throughout the hearings, initially without sign of
any resolution. By the last round of hearings, in March of 1908, the
Supreme Court had just a month earlier issued its decision in the WhiteSmith case.73 As already noted, the Court-relying heavily on the fact that
Congress itself had not amended the statute--concluded that under the
statute as it then stood, composers had no right to control recordings of their
works. 74
The Court had deferred to Congress-which then deferred back to the
Court.75 Representative Currier observed that composer Victor Herbert,
whose views doubtless represented a great many other composers, was
"asking us to create for him an absolutely new prope~ right, which the
6
Supreme Court says has absolutely no existence." Representative
Barchfeld added that "[y]ou are coming to Congress and asking for
additional legislation to give you a right which the law does not now give
you. The Supreme Court has declared that you have no standing in court."11
The issue had become a mutual finger-pointing exercise, with the
Supreme Court unwilling to create or recognize rights that Congress had not
chosen to create or recognize, and the Congress apparently unwilling to
create or recognize rights that the Supreme Court had not chosen to create or
recognize. Whereas at an earlier point, a bill to grant rights to composers
might have seemed unremarkable, after the Supreme Court's decision, such a
bill seemed to fly in the face of established authority. With this posture, the
hearings took on the quality of a stalemate.

72. Between 1902 and 1917, assets of the Victor Talking Machine Company,
predecessor to the RCA Victor company, went from $2.7 million to $33.2 million, a twelvefold increase. The company's founder, Eldridge Johnson, "had become a tycoon; and several
of the men whose careers dated back to the founding of the company were millionaires, or
well on their way." ROLAND GEUATI, THE FABULOUS PHONOGRAPH: FROM EDISON TO
STEREO 151 (1965). And this was at a time, 1910, when one dollar "would buy a sevencourse dinner at a first-class restaurant." /d. at 149. The British recording company,
Gramaphone, saw its net profits rise from £79,348 in 1901 to £137,268 in 1902 and to
£252,285 (over $1 million) in 1903. /d. at 122.
73. See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
74. /d. at 14.
75. /d.
76. Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 60th
Cong. (1908), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part K at 193 (comment of
Representative Currier) (emphasis added).
77. /d. (comments of Representative Barchfeld) (emphasis added).
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A stalemate leads Congress to compromise. In the fmal round of
hearings, members and witnesses seized on the proposal to establish a
"com~ulsory license" as a compromise between full copyright rights and
none. 8 A compulsory license meant that composers would receive a nonnegotiated, statutorily prescribed royalty when their compositions were
recorded more than once.79 Hearings participants fmally struck an
agreement on a compulsol]o license some time after the hearings closed. In
short order, it became law. 0
History now shows us that notwithstanding the vigorous discussion at
the hearings about how recorded music would boost the sale of sheet music,
the sheet music market soon withered under the dual onslaught of the
phonograph and later the radio. 81 Today, music in the home almost
78. In addition to the Supreme Court's ruling in the White-Smith case, the compulsory
license provision in the 1909 Copyright Act was also inspired by fears of a recording industry
monopoly. A leading piano roll company of the day, the 1Eolian Company, had signed
contracts with many music publishers that would have granted 1Eolian exclusive rights to the
music for which copyright was held by the publishers. These contracts were conditioned upon
either the Supreme Court or Congress declaring that recording music without permission was
an infringement of the composers' rights. By the end of 1906, about 500 publishers had
signed such contracts. A number of music publishers, in other words, had signed contracts
that would be ineffective if copyright were found not to apply to sound recordings, but would
automatically transfer copyright permissions to 1Eolian if copyright were found to apply. See
Revision of Copyright lAws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong.
(1906), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part J at 277-80 (statement of Albert H.
Walker).
79. Composers were not obliged to permit any recording of their compositions.
However, having once voluntarily negotiated with a recording company to permit recording,
composers were then subject to the compulsory license provision: other recording companies
could record the same composition on payment of the statutorily prescribed fee whether the
composer liked it or not.
80. Representative Currier introduced a bill that included the compulsory license
provision on March 2, 1909. See H.R. 28192 § 1(e), included in H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th
Cong. (1909), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part S at 22-24 (1976). The bill
specified a compulsory royalty of two cents per record for anyone to record compositions that
had already been licensed by the composer for recording. The next day it passed in both the
House and the Senate. See 43 CONG REC. 3768-69 (1909) (House version); 43 CONG REC.
3744 (1909) (Senate version). President Roosevelt signed it the following day, March 4. See
43 CONG REC. 3831-32 (1909).
81. A turning point of sorts was around 1921, when music publishing companies first
began releasing compositions to phonograph recording companies before exhausting sheet
music sales. See SANJEK & SANJEK supra note 44, at 20. By 1924, roughly seven to eight
million phonographs were in use, compared with about five million pianos and less than a
million player pianos. Copyrights: Hearings on H.R. 6250 and H.R. 9137 Before the House
Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong. (1924) (statement of E.C. Mills). As one commentator noted
about the wildly popular ''Victrola" phonograph machine introduced in 1906, "[o]nce, a piano

678

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 23:657

invariably means radio or recorded music, the income from which easily
dwarfs that of sheet music sales. 82 Congress, in short, was terribly wrong in
its assessment of the role that recorded music would come to play in
American life-and accordingly in its assessment of the relative significance
of recorded music and sheet music for copyright law.

B.

Motion Pictures

Invented toward the end of the 19th century, 83 motion pictures were
84
confirmed as copyrightable subject matter by an appellate court in 1903.
had graced the parlor of the middle-class home and gave it an air of refinement and
culture. Now a fine Victrola and a collection of the exclusive Victor Red Seal records made
the same statement." ANDRE MILLARD, AMERICA ON REcORD: A HISfORY OF REcORDED
SouND 131 (1995). Later, it was radio that nearly drove the phonograph recording business
out of business. Sharply improved sound quality boosted sales of radio receivers in the "radio
Christmas" season of 1924; in that same year, sales of phonograph record players from the
Victor company dropped 60%, and those of Edison's company dropped more than 50%. /d.
at 138. See also GELATI, supra note 72, at 265 (stating "by January 1933, the record business
in America was practically extinct"). Jukeboxes were largely responsible for rescuing the
recorded music industry: in 1936, over half of all records were produced for the jukebox
market. MILLARD, supra at 169. In the ironic flip-flops that have characterized the
commercialization of sound technology, radio broadcasting went into decline when television
began to usurp the market for live musical and variety performances in the late 1940s and
early 1950s. Phonograph records in part accounted for radio's reemergence as an important
medium for music. MICHAEL FINK, INSIDE THE MUSIC BUSINESS 14 (1989) (stating "[r]adio,
which in the early 1920s had nearly destroyed the record business, now owed its own recovery
to its new role as something of a promotional tool for the recording industry"); SEGRAVE,
supra note 70, at 50.
82. See LEONARD FEIST, AN INTRODUCTION TO POPULAR MUSIC PUBUSHING IN AMERICA
47 (1980).
While the American population had swelled [since the 1920s] and its musical
skills and awareness had grown, sheet music has never regained an economic
significance in direct ratio to these changes. Where once a single popular
song frequently sold over one million printed copies, purchase of half that
number in a country with a trebled population was regarded as a phenomenon
in the 1970s.
/d. Interestingly, even the medium of sheet music is adaptable to the digital age. As of this
writing (Fall 1998), one company, called "Sunhawk," which came to the attention of this
writer by accident, has developed a sort of "interactive sheet music" in digital format that can
be bought over the Internet. See Solero and Sunhawk Technology <http://www.sunhawk.
com!hawk/techfct.html>.
83. In 1872, zoologist Eadweard Muybridge designed what he called a
"zoopraxiscope," a rotating disk with still images on it. Viewers would look through a small
hole at the rotating disk and see a form of animation. Muybridge designed the device to
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The new-use issue-whether motion pictures made use of and hence
infringed some preexisting copyrighted work-appears not to have arisen in
the early days of the industry. Most likely, the absence of major new-use
infringement questions can be attributed to the fact that movies, at first, did
not record or make use of some already copyrightable works in the way that
the phonograph made use of already copyrightable music. In addition, not
until the mid-1920s was sound added to motion pictures; necessarily, the use
of music or other sounds on films as a possible new-use copyright
infringement would not arise before that time.85
Indeed, for the first ten or so years of development, most motion
pictures were recordings of live events and scenes,86 which are not
copyrightable. The early years of motion picture performance in one
American city, Rochester, New York, for example, featured films of
wrestling matches, dancing performances, horse racing, railroad trains
entering a station, "a tub race, the coronation of the present czar, a
watermelon match, a Parisian street scene, march of the French school
children," and other "views": travel scenes from Moscow, Budapest,
Venice, Dresden, and the United States.87 Much of the appeal of movies was
that they brought distant and exotic scenes to one's hometown.88 Not until
resolve a major controversy of his day: whether all four feet of a horse are ever off the ground
at the same time when the horse is galloping. M. JACKSON-WRIGLEY & ERIC LEYLAND, THE
CINEMA 7-8 (1939). By 1885, William Friese-Greene had demonstrated a motion picture
projected onto a screen. Id. at 6. Thomas Edison's assistant, William Dickson, was
pioneering many of the advances later credited to Edison himself in the late 1880s. JoHN
FELL, A HISTORY OF FILMs 10-11 (1979) (source on file with author).
84. Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240 (3d Cir. 1903).
85. See MITLARD, supra note 81, at 152-55.
86. For that matter, many early phonograph recordings were of nonmusical events, such
as lectures, comedy monologues, religious evangelism, and the like. See GELATI, supra note
72, at 88-89; MITLARD, supra note 81, at 81. In part, tum of the century recording was driven
by the fact that some sounds reproduced much better than others: banjo sounds, for example,
were much easier to reproduce than violin sounds, and male voices could more easily be
reproduced than female voices. MITLARD, supra note 81, at 81. Unlike motion picture
technology, however, sound recordings required considerable equipment and typically were
done in a recording studio.
87. GEORGE C. PRAIT, "No Magic, No Mystery, No Sleight of Hand": The First Ten
Years of Motion Pictures in Rochester, in "IMAGE" ON THE ART AND EVOLUTION OF THE FILM:
PHOTOGRAPHS AND ARTICLES FROM THE MAGAZINE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MUSEUM OF
PHOTOGRAPHY 39, 39-42 (Marshall Deutelbaum, ed., 1979) (quoting a contemporaneous
newspaper account).
88. See KRisTIN THOMPSON & DAVID BORDWELL, FILM HISTORY: AN INTRODUCTION 12
(1994) (stating "most [film] subjects were nonfiction, or 'actualities.' These might be
'scenics,' or short travelogues, offering views of distant lands") (source on file with
author). Films like this were only a minute or two long. Films were widely offered for rental
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some years' worth of these vignettes had passed and the public's attention
had begun to wane did motion pictures as a vehicle for dramatic storytelling
come to the fore. After years of frequent showings of the travel oriented
"views," for example, the city of Rochester went near~ two years, between
1901 and 1903, with no motion picture showings at all. 9 At that point, films
"were still in danger of permanent extinction . . . . Their rescue came single
handedly from the introduction and advance of the 'story'
film ... comprising a series of scenes related to a central character or group
of characters."90
The first "stories" told were, perhaps not surprisingly, adaptations of
stage dramas. Two notable films of this period are often cited as turning
points in motion pictures' history, Edison Films' The Great Train Robbery
in 1903, and D.W. Griffith's The Birth of a Nation in 1915. The former
film was based on a road show drama of the same name, 91 while Griffith's
was based on a 1905 play, The Clansman. 92
When motion pictures became a vehicle for the adaptation of stage
plays, the first new-use issue involving motion pictures arose. Toward the
end of the century, publisher Harper & Brothers had bought the copyright to
a recent popular novel by General Lew Wallace, Ben Hur, for the purpose of
"dramatizing" the novel as that term was then used: making a stage
play. Around the same time the Kalem Company decided to make a motion
picture of the Wallace novel, hiring a writer to develop what today we would
call a screenplay. It then made the film from the screenplay and licensed
theaters to show it. Harper & Brothers brought suit. 93
At that time, dramatic works themselves had been explicit
copyrightable subject matter for about thirty-five years-since 1856-long
before motion pictures had been invented.94 When the right to "dramatize"
in film catalogs, such as those of the American Mutoscope and Biograph company in 1902,
which classified its films as "'Comedy, Vaudeville, Trick, Sports and Pastimes, Notable
Personages, Railroads, Scenic, Fire and Police, Military, Parades, Marine, Children,
Educational, Expositions, Machinery, Miscellaneous."' DAVID ROBINSON, FROM PEEP SHOW
TO PALACE: THE BmTH OF AMERICAN Fn.M 71 (1996) (quoting the American Mutoscope and
Biograph catalogue), a litany strongly suggestive of nonfiction content. Exceptions were
notable:
Parisian Georges Melies "transformed the cinema into a narrative
medium ... creating [around 1900] his own fantasy universe at a time when most .filmmakers
were still content simply to photograph the world as it appeared before them." /d. at 74-75
(emphasis added).
89. PRATI, supra note 87, at 52.
90. !d. at 52.
91. ROBINSON, supra note 88, at 81.
92. PRATI, supra note 87, at 46.
93. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 60 (1911) [hereinafter Kalem II].
94. Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1133 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552).
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an existing nondramatic work was added in 1891,95 it encompassed only
stage plays: although motion picture research was well underway by 1891,
96
the first public showing of a motion picture was not unti11895.
The district court found for the plaintiff, Harper & Brothers.97 The
Second Circuit heard the first appeal and concluded that Kalem had indeed
infringed Harper's right to dramatize the novel. 98 The court determined that
showing a film was the same as putting on a play.99 Kalem apparently
argued that a play contained spoken dialog and that its movie was, like other
movies of the day, a silent fllm. 100 This sort of factual distinction seems
wholly irrelevant today, and struck the court as not much more even then:
live dramatic productions include pantomime, noted the court, so that the
absence of sound in a movie simply made the movie like a pantomime. 101
Kalem also argued that it could not be an infringer because it had taken
only the novel's ideas, not its "writing."102 Today we might look on this as
The act of August 18, 1856 (11 Stat. 138), provides, that any copyright
thereafter granted under the laws of the United States, "to the author or
proprietor of any dramatic composition, designed or suited for public
representation, shall be deemed and taken to confer upon the said author or
proprietor, his heirs and assigns, along with the sole right to print and publish
the said composition, the sole right also to act, perform, or represent the same,
or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented, on any stage or public
place, during the whole period for which the copyright is obtained."
/d.

95. Today we know the right at issue as the broader one of either controlling the
making of "derivative works" or the making of a "public performance" of the work under
section 106 of the United States Code.
96. ALBERT R. FuLTON, MOTION PICTURES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ART FROM SilENT
Fll.MSTOTiiEAGEOFTELEVISION (Norman ed., 1960).
97. Harper & Bros v. Kalem Co., 169 F. 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1909) [hereinafter Kaleml].
"A final decree granting a perpetual injunction was entered in the court below, from which
this appeal is taken." /d.
98. /d. at 63. "When the film is put on an exhibiting machine, which reproduces the
action of the actors and animals, we think it does become a dramatization, and infringes the
exclusive right of the owner of the copyrighted book to dramatize it ...." /d.
99. /d.
100. See Kalem I, 169 F. at 64.
101. /d.
102. /d. In the Supreme Court, Kalem also argued that motion pictures are just part of
a machine and hence could not infringe copyrights. Kalem II, 222 U.S. at 58. 'The exhibition
of the pictures, arranged upon a film which is, during all the time of its use, a part of a
machine, is not an infringement of the book copyright." /d. The ·~ust-part-of-a-machine"
argument followed arguments made earlier that piano rolls did not infringe copyright. See
Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 F. 584, 584 (C.C.D. Mass. 1888) (stating "I cannot convince
myself that these perforated strips of paper are copies of sheet music, within the meaning of
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the familiar argument that copyright protects only "expressions" of ideas, not
the actual ideas themselves. But the court viewed the argument more as
going to a combination of subject matter and infringement: can a movie
made from a novel itself be a "writing" and hence infringe the rights in the
103
novel?
The court misunderstood the nature of infringement, which does
not depend on the infringing work being itself copyrightable, 104 but no
matter: the court concluded that the Constitutional term "writing" had over
the years been broadly applied to paintings, statutes, etc.l and so was not
offended by being extended to cover "film dramatizations." 05
The Supreme Court agreed with the Second Circuit in an opinion by
Justice Holmes issued in 1911. 106 Unlike the Second Circuit, the Supreme
Court understood that the issue was not the copyrightability of the
film. More precisely, where the appeals court had seemed to think that
infringement by the film depended on the film itself sustaining a copyright
(being considered a "writing"), the Supreme Court noted that the film's own
copyrightabili~ had nothing to do with escaping the charge of
infringement. 1
But like the Second Circuit, even the Supreme Court
focused on the matter of the movie's silence as being the touchstone of the
question whether it could be a dramatization. 108 Again, the familiar analogy
of pantomime carried the day, with the Supreme Court finding only a slight
and legally insignificant difference between a "live" pantomime and a filmed
one:
We are of opinion that Ben Hur was dramatized by what was
done .... Action can tell a story, display all the most vivid
relations between men, and depict every kind of human emotion,
without the aid of a word. It would be impossible to deny the title
of drama to pantomime as played by masters of the art. Daly v.
the copyright law. They are not made to be addressed to the eye as sheet music, but they form
part of a machine"); see also White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. I, 7
(1908) (stating "[t]hings intended for mechanical function-for use in themselves-will not
infringe copyright ....") (argument of Charles S. Burton and John J. O'Connell, counsel for
defendant player-piano manufacturer Apollo Company). It also foreshadowed similar
arguments raised nearly a hundred years later over computer programs in read-only memory,
in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating
"[d]efendant argues that there can be no copyright protection for the ROMs because they are
utilitarian objects or machine parts"). However, these arguments had little effect in Kalem II.
103. See Kalem /, 169 F. at 65.
104. /d. at 63.
105. /d. at 64-65.
106. Kalem II, 222 U.S. at 63.
107. /d. at 62.
108. /d.
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Palmer, 6 Blatchf. 256, 264. But if a pantomime of Ben Hur
would be a dramatizing of Ben Hur, it would be none the less so
that it was exhibited to the audience by reflection from a glass and
not by direct vision of the figures-as sometimes has been done in
order to produce ghostly or inexplicable effects. The essence of
the matter in the case last supposed is not the mechanism employed
109
but that we see the event or story lived.

The Court reached past superficial arguments to see "the essence of the
matter" without being distracted by a focus on the "mechanism
employed." 110 Perhaps this was a mild retreat from the White-Smith case's
insistence only three years earlier that copyrifht applied only to the
11
mechanism, and not to the essence of the matter.
In any event, the motion
picture industry fell under the obligation to pay royalties for stories used and
nevertheless rapidly grew to become the major economic force it is today.
C.

Cable Television

112

Rural homes in the 1950s, especially those in valleys or on the far side
of mountains, were often unable to receive television signals clearly. With
hindsight, it seems a logical improvement for someone to erect a large
receiving antenna on the top of a mountain and "pipe" the received signal
along a wire cable to those rural homes. The first term coined for what we
call "cable television" today was "CATV," which stood for "Community

109. Id. at 61. The actual basis of the motion picture studio's liability for
"dramatization" of the novel in theaters-under the control of independent contractors-was
the doctrine of contributory infringement.
The defendant not only expected but invoked by advertisement the use of its
films for dramatic reproduction of the story. That was the most conspicuous
purpose for which they could be used, and the one for which especially they
were made. If the defendant did not contribute to the infringement it is
impossible to do so except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on
principles recognized in every part of the law.
Id. at 62-63 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
110. Kalem II, 222 U.S. at 61.
111. See supra text accompanying note 26.
112. Much of the discussion of cable television is drawn from HARDY I, supra note 8, at
252-56 and from I. Trotter Hardy, Computer RAM "Copies": Hit or Myth? Historical
Perspectives on Caching as a Microcosm of Current Copyright Concerns, 22 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 423, 442-46 (1997) [hereinafter Hardy IT].
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Antenna Television." 113 Quite simple in concept, the idea of bringing
television signals over a wire instead of through the air was novel. But it
was successful, and the cable industry began to grow~
Not surprisingly, the copyright owners of the television programs being
picked up by cable receiving antennas and transmitted to additional homes
began to demand royalty payments from the cable companies. These
demands were refused; lawsuits for copyright infringement followed shortly
thereafter. Two similar cases involving these facts reached the United States
Supreme Court a few years apart, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc. 114 and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. 115
The issue in both cases was whether a cable station that, without
authorization, received and further transmitted a copyrighted program should
be held to be a copyright infringer. 116 Plaintiffs theory was that such a
transmission constituted a "performance" of the copyrighted works. 117 As
the performances were to the public and for profit (cable companies were
not, to put it in Justice Holmes's famous words, "eleemosynary"
institutions) 118 and were accomplished without permission or royalties,
119
plaintiffs argued that the cable stations infringed their copyright rights.
The defendant cable companies argued, quite straightforwardly, that merely
120
by picking up a signal and passing it on, they did not "perform" anything. The
Supreme Court found for the defendant cable companies, determining that cable
systems did not "perform" the shows they transmitted. 121 This conclusion was
113. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 391
(1968). See also MARY AucE MAYER PHILUPS, CATV: A HISTORY OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA
TELEVISION 4 (1972).
114. 392 u.s. 390 (1968).
115. 415 u.s. 394 (1974).
116. Fortnightly dealt with broadcast signals picked up from the local area and
transmitted over cable. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390
(1968). Teleprompter dealt with broadcast signals picked up from distant markets.
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). For purposes of the
discussion in this article, both raise the same issues.
117. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 395; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 402.
118. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594 (1917). One early cable system was
created by John Walson, part owner of an appliance store, in 1948 to boost sales of television
sets in the local, rural area. PHILUPs, supra note 113, at 8-9. Initially given away, this cable
service proved so popular that the very next year, 1949, Walson began charging a $100
installation fee and two dollars per month. Id.
119. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 390; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 404.
120. 'The petitioner maintains that its CATV systems did not 'perform' the copyrighted
works at all." Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 395.
121. Id. at 402.

1999]

Hardy

685

founded largely on the reasoning that cable companies were merely passive
carriers122 that did not rise to the level of "performing" in the ordinary sense of
that tenn----or as the Court put it, ''Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not
123
perform."
The Court viewed cable as merely an extension of broadcast
television, of little economic or other significance in itself. 124 ''Essentially, a
CATV system no more than enhances the viewer's capacity to receive the
broadcaster's signals ...." 125 Cable systems
"have nothing to do with sponsors, program content or
arrangement. They sell community antenna service to a segment of
the public for which [broadcasters'] programs were intended but
which is not able, because of location or topographical condition,
to receive them without rebroadcast or other relay service by
•
,126
commumty antennae ....

In other words, the Court saw cable television functioning mainly to promote
some other already paid for medium-in this case, broadcast television-in
much the same way that phonograph recordings were first seen as merely
. sheet mustc.
. 127
promotmg
·
122. Note that the cable companies were not "passive carriers" as that term is often
used in connection with telephone companies or Internet Service Providers. In the latter
cases, the carrier is in a contractual relation with the sender of the information in
question. With the cable companies, there was no contractual relation with the sender-the
broadcasting companies-at all. In addition, cable companies have the ability to choose what
signals to receive and retransmit, and to what audiences they will perform the retransmission.
123. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398 (citation omitted). The Court announced that it
would not simply look to the ordinary meaning of the word "perform," noting instead that
[a]t the outset it is clear that the petitioner's systems did not "perform"
the respondent's copyrighted works in any conventional sense of that term, or
in any manner envisaged by the Congress that enacted the law in 1909. But
our inquiry cannot be limited to ordinary meaning and legislative history ....
Id. at 395 (citations omitted). But in fact, the majority opinion largely did limit itself to
ordinary meaning, especially in concluding that: "Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not
perform. Thus, while both broadcaster and viewer play crucial roles in the total television
process, a line is drawn between them. One is treated as active performer; the other, as
passive beneficiary." Id. at 398-99 (citations omitted).
124. !d. at 399.
125. Id. See also id. at 400 (where the court stated "[b]roadcasters procure programs
and propagate them to the public; CATV systems receive programs that have been released to
the public and carry them by private channels to additional viewers").
126. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 400 n.28 (quoting Intermountain Broad. & Television
Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196 F. Supp 315,325 (D. Idaho 1961)).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
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Just as Congress was shortsighted in its assessment of recorded music a
generation earlier, so the Supreme Court was dramatically shortsighted in its
assessment of the significance of cable television. Far from remaining
merely an adjunct to broadcast television, by the time Congress was revising
the Copyright Act in the mid-1970s, the cable industry was a major
economic force: nearly 3500 cable operators served 7700 communities,
reaching 10.8 million homes and earning revenues of $770 million. 128 Cable
was well beyond the point of simply extending existing broadcast signals to
a wider and rural audience. It had become an alternative network, competing
129
with broadcast networks -and for that matter, ~owing much more rapidly
in urban, affluent areas than among the rural poor. 130
In a replay of what had happened with recorded sound a generation
earlier when Congress debated the protection of musical compositions
against the backdrop of a negative Supreme Court ruling, near endless
Congressional debates 131 over cable television's copyright obligations arose
against the backdrop of a negative Supreme Court ruling. In the end, as with
the phonograph, a compromise was reached: Cable companies would pay a
royalty, but the royalty would be fixed by Coniess, and copyright owners
would have no choice but to accept that royalty. 1 2
D.

Current New-Use Issues

The Internet has begun a new round of new-use issues. One such issue
is whether audio and video sent over the Internet infringe any copyright
rights. Digitizing audio or video signals-whether live or recorded-is quite
simple with today' s computers. Once digitized and resident on a computer's
hard disk, these digital files can be set up to be played on demand. A
number of new uses have appeared that depend on this digitizing
capability. One innovative company developed a technique to play digitized
music files over a telephone line as a customized aural greeting, in the
process fulfilling one of Alexander Graham Bell's predictions about the
128. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 88 (1976).
129. PAUL GOlDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE, § 5.8.2 at p. 642
(1996).
130. See Phillips, supra note 113, at 171-72 (stating: "Industry leaders have recently
expressed concern for a neglected sector of the American public-the rural dweller'')
(emphasis added; statement published in 1972).
131. See Litman, supra note 7, at 332 (stating "[i]t took eleven years and the combined
efforts of the Copyright Office, the bar associations, the House and Senate Subcommittees, the
FCC, and the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy to force interested parties to
reach an agreement on the revision bill's treatment of cable television").
132. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELLL. REV. 857 (1987). See also 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1994).
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telephone's use for music some hundred years after he first made it. 133 A
trade association representing music recording companies, the Recording
Industry Association of America ("RIAA"), filed suit against this telephone
music provider in early 1996 and soon thereafter a settlement was reached in
which the defendant company agreed to stop making this use of copyrighted
music. 134 As a settlement, of course, this proceeding did not establish that
the new-use in question was infringing, though that seems likely to have
been the outcome had the matter continued to trial.
Many Internet sites make recorded music available on demand over the
Internet. Apparently these sites, at least initially, did not obtain licenses for
their distributions. The RIAA sent a cease-and-desist letter to one such site,
then called AudioNet.com, in early 1996 for exactly that activity. 135 The
site-since renamed broadcast.com-has apparently removed the allegedly
infringin~ materials and claims to have licensed the materials it continues to
provide. 1 6 This same site provides links to live radio and television
broadcasts, as well as various concerts and other audio and video
events. This author is not aware of any conclusive legal determination that
133. See LEWIS COE, THE 'TELEPHONE AND ITS SEVERAL INVENTORS: A HISTORY 78

(1995).
134. See Recording Industry Association of America, Nine Record Companies Reach
Settlement In Infringement Action <http://www.riaa.com/antipir/ releases/nine.htm> (stating
Send-A-Song operates a commercial service for customers to order particular
recordings to be played over the telephone, accompanied by a personal
message, in the form of an "aural greeting card." Prior to the settlement,
Send-A-Song made copies of the plaintiffs' sound recordings without the
plaintiffs' consent, stored them in Send-A-Song's computers, and then
transmitted these copies over the telephone to the recipients of Send-ASong's services).
135. See Recording Industry Association of America, RIM Demands Internet Service
Stop Violating Record Companies' Rights <http://www.riaa.com/antipir/releases/rights.htm>.
136. See broadcast. com, Tenns and Conditions <http://www.broadcast.com/about/
terms.html> (stating "[a]ll material on this site, including but not limited to images,
illustrations, audio clips, and video clips, is protected by copyrights which are owned and
controlled by broadcast.com or by other parties that have licensed their material to
broadcast.com") (emphasis added); Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA
Releases Midyear Anti-Piracy Stats: CD Seizures, Dominated by Bootlegs, Increase
Astronomically and Overtake Cassette Seizures <http://www.riaa.com/antipir/releases/
midstats.htm> (stating:
the RIAA demanded an Internet service stop violating record companies'
rights when it sent a cease and desist letter to AudioNet. The company was
providing an interactive service that offered 400 digital performances of fulllength albums from a variety of musical genres, without the authority of many
of the various sound recording copyright owners. AudioNet dropped all the
infringing works within days).
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such Internet live "broadcasts" infringe copyrights, so technically this newuse issue remains an open question. Nonetheless, the brief dispute with the
RIAA and even the name change to broadcast.com certainly suggest that the
site regards itself as a kind of broadcasting station, presumably subject to the
same copyright rules as other more traditional broadcasters like radio and
television.
V. NEWUSES: ANALYSIS
When new technologies raise the new-use issue, the debate unfolds in a
surprisingly predictable way. Whatever the forum, whether in congressional
hearings or in court, representatives of authors and composers and those
who, like publishers and distributors, are allied with those interests appear
on one side. These parties tend to stress that copyright has long
accommodated new technologies, that Congress intended to protect works of
authorship in general, and that authors make little enough money as it is such
that they need all the incentives that a new technology can give them; and
consequently, that Congress ought to ensure that the new technology falls
under a full regime of copyright liability applicable to existing technologies.
Opposing these arguments will be representatives of user groups: the
owners of the new technology like radio that enables the new-use of others'
copyrighted works, along with perhaps libraries, schools, research
organizations, or the like. These parties concentrate their arguments either
on a narrow reading of the statute as not applicable to the technology, or on
the broader and more appealing argument that the new technology deserves a
chance to grow without the encumbrance of exposure to copyright liability,
or that the new-use of copyrighted works merely advertises the old use and
as an affirmative benefit to copyright owners should not be held to infringe
the existing works.
The arguments on both sides encompass two important policy
considerations: the benefits of giving new technologies "room to grow" by
not encumbering them with full copyright liability; and the benefits of
ensuring that as a technology grows to become economically significant,
those who create works of authorship for it will have an adequate incentive
to continue their creative efforts. Sometimes the "no encumbrance" side of
this argument has won out, as happened in the Supreme Court's decisions
that cable television did not have to pay royalties to the creators of broadcast
television programs. 137 At other times the reverse has been true, as happened

137. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968);
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
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when courts decided that radio broadcasters did have to pay royalties for the
copyrighted material they broadcast.138
The argument that a new-use merely "advertises" an old use and hence
should not be held to infringe is a particularly familiar one and leads
naturally into the heart of this article's analysis of the new-use
issue. Representatives of the phonograph recording industries in the 1900s
strongly argued to Congress that records merely served as advertising for the
sheet music market; 139 the producers of the motion picture Ben Hur argued
before the Supreme Court that their movie would benefit sales of the
book; 140 radio station owners in the 1920s argued to Congress that radio
served mainly to advertise the sales of sheet music; 141 library photocopying
of journal articles in the 1950s and 1960s was described by some as
primarily a beneficial advertisement for the journals; 142 the Supreme Court
found that cable television in the late 1960s merely promoted broadcast
television; 143 representatives of an Internet news site argued that "framing"
others' web sites benefited the sites framed; 144 the owner of an Internet site
celebrating widely available digitized music over the Internet argued that the
availabili~ of such music benefited the bands whose music was thus made
·
available. 45
138. See e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 780 (D.N.J.
1923).
139. See supra text accompanying note 71.
140. Kalem II, 222 U.S. at 57 (1911). "Not only is there no evidence here that the
copyright proprietors were injured even in the slightest degree; but, on the contrary, the
defendant asserted by letter that its films would benefit the complainants, and this they did not
deny, but stood upon their naked assertion of legal right." /d.
141. See To Amend the Copyright Act: Hearings on S. 2600 Before the Subcomm. of
the Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong. 31-32 (1924) (statement of Charles H. Tuttle of the
National Association of Broadcasters).
142. John C. Koepke, Assessment of Documentation Practices in Reprography, IN
REPROGRAPHY AND COPYRIGHt' LAW 50, ·53 (Lowell H. Hattery & George P. Bush eds., 1964)
(stating:
The small journal will tell you that photoduplication actually increases its
circulation rather than decreases it .... We have talked to many librarians
who have told us that, after seven or eight requests for an article that may
have appeared in a rather obscure journal, they have found it desirable to
begin to subscribe to the journal ....).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 123-127.
144. DavidS. Hilzenrath, Online Publishers Wage a Battle Over Frame and Fortune,
'!HE WASH. PoST, Feb. 11, 1997, at D4. "'A lot of news organizations are very pleased by
what [TotaiNews is] doing,' because TotalNews generates more visitors to their sites, said
Lisa Farringer, a Washington attorney representing TotalNews." /d. (emphasis omitted).
145. See Michael Robertson, Artists Use MP3 To Reach More Fans, Sell More CDs
<http://www.mp3.com/news/088.html> (stating:
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On their face, these advertising arguments make no sense. Even when
the arguments are true-and it has often been true that a new-use of
146
copyrighted works does promote the sales of an existing format -nothing
in copyright policy supports the obliging of authors to advertise their
creativity, and certainly not obliging them to advertise on terms and in places
that they may not desire. 147 If authors have a right to object to others'
advertising their works, in circumstances where withholding their objections
would benefit them, then the authors will simJ?Jy withhold their objections in
order to gain the benefits of the advertising. 1 After all, novelists have the
One strategy for artists to consider is to seed the Internet with one or more
songs. This enables music listeners to get a taste of an artist's style or a
sample from a CD. If they like what they hear they will spread the music and
a percentage will buy the CD).
The term "MP3" refers to a type of data compression technology that is especially suited to
compressing digital music files.
146. The music business has been particularly attuned to the desirability of advertising
music through new uses, from vaudeville and phonograph records, which initially advertised
sheet music sales, to radio, which advertised first sheet music sales then phonograph record
sales and now CDs. See generally SEGRAVE, supra note 70; see also id. at 13, 37, 51
(vaudeville advertising sheet music, radio advertising sheet music, and radio advertising
records). The number of new bands that voluntarily permit their music to be digitized and
available on the World Wide Web today suggests that these bands find the new-use of Internet
broadcasting to be valuable advertising. One popular music download site,
<http://www.mp3.com>, claimed that "MP3.com is the #1 music download site on the
Internet, with 3,000,000 visitors per month. In the past year, MP3.com has facilitated more
than 5,000,000 legal, original song downloads-approximately 75,000 songs daily." Michael
Robertson, Platinwn Entertainment Offers Free MP3 Downloads Via MP3.Com
<http://www.mp3.com/news/123.html>.
147. Accord M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 779-80 (D.N.J.
1923).
There is another point which, although striking us as immaterial,
deserves some comment. The defendant argues that the plaintiff should not
complain of the broadcasting of its song because of the great advertising
service thereby accorded the copyrighted number. Our own opinion of the
possibilities of advertising by radio leads us to the belief that the broadcasting
of a newly copyrighted musical composition would greatly enhance the sales
of the printed sheet. But the copyright owners and the music publishers
themselves are perhaps the best judges of the method of popularizing musical
selections. There may be various methods of bringing them to the attention of
music lovers. It may be that one type of song is treated differently than a song
of another type. But, be that as it may, the method, we think, is the privilege
of the owner. He has the exclusive right to publish and vend, as well as to
perform.
!d.
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right to object to someone else's publishing their novels, yet most novelists
are all too eager to waive that right in return for that very publication. That
_
is how copyright law works.
Behind these nonsensical facial arguments about advertising, we can
discover a much more principled assertion that focuses on authors'
incentives to create. In copyright terms, the advertising argument can be
understood as saying that because a particular new-use benefits copyright
authors, those authors do not need any further incentive to create for the
new-use medium. If they need no further incentive, then imposing
infringement liability for the new-uses merely penalizes the public by
requiring them to pay for something that would have been created and
available for free anyway. 149
148. In the June 1906 hearings on what became the 1909 Copyright Act, the testimony
of witness Paul Cromelin of the Columbia Phonograph Company, went for pages and pages,
with numerous quoted letters from others to him, all designed to convince Congress that
phonograph record sales did indeed benefit music composers through the sale of sheet
music. At one point, Mr. Cromelin was interrupted by Representative John Chaney, who
asked how the granting of a right to composers to control recordings would make any
difference to that state of affairs:
MR. CHANEY. Let me ask you this question: There is not very much doubt
but what your theory of this is all right-that all these people [i.e.,
composers] want to get their music before the public, and they are seeking
every means of advertising it. Now, in this bill, should it pass [and give
composers the right to demand royalties from recording], is there anything to
prevent that continuing, and, if so, what is it that would interfere with it?
See BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part Hat 333.
At which point Cromelin appeared mildly flustered and was saved when another
witness, attorney Albert H. Walker, quickly steered the discussion to other concerns, namely
that music publishers, acting on behalf of composers, would all sign exclusive contracts with a
single manufacturer of piano rolls, the iEolian Company, and hence create an unstoppable
monopoly:
MR. WALKER. [A]s soon as the iEolian contract goes into effect the
[music] publishers will no longer be at liberty to send these pieces to Mr.
Cromelin, and will be under an ironclad contract running for thirty-five years
to sell them to the iEolian Company only.
See id. at 334.
The arguments that music publishers would tie up composers in a web of exclusive
contracts, and that such exclusive arrangements constituted a harmful monopoly, seem a bit
hypocritical: recording companies like Cromelin's routinely signed exclusive contracts with
perfonners, contracts that at times included royalty payments based on the sales of the
records. See id. at 215-17 (testimony from various parties concerning recording companies'
exclusive contracts with certain performers).
149. See, e.g., GolDSTEIN, supra note 129, § 1.14 at p. 1:40 (noting the argument that
''To give greater property rights than are needed to obtain the desired quantity and quality of
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Even understood in this more principled way, the arguments about
advertising and authors' incentives miss the mark. The question is not
whether an incentive is necessary when works of authorship like music
already exist and a technology like the phonograph, radio, cable television,
or the Internet is new. At its earliest stages-say, on the date of its first
invention-a new-use technology will obviously not have an effect on
authors' incentives. It would be silly to suggest that the day Edison first
achieved the playback of a recorded sound or the Internet first transmitted an
audio file of music, music composers everywhere suddenly had a need for an
additional royalty incentive in order to continue composing.
Obviously the day of invention-even if it could clearly be identifiedis too soon to look at the question of a new technology's effects on copyright
incentives. We should instead ask: will this new-use technology grow in
economic importance, at some point in the future, to the point that not
imposing royalty obligations on it would seriously diminish authors'
incentives to create? If that point never comes, then we should never impose
royalty obligations on the new-use. If it does come, then we should.
Determining the "right" degree of incentives, let alone when they
become necessary, is an issue fraught with difficulty. Rather than undertake
that task, we can make a simplifying assumption. Let us assume for
purposes of analysis that at the time a new-use technology arises, the
existing copyright incentives are already at the "right"-the necessary and
appropriate-level for all other technologies and uses. That is, instead of
trying to calculate a measure of incentives and asking when authorial
incentives in the aggregate, from all possible uses of copyrighted works,
have reached or deviated from the "right" level, we can instead ask the easier
question of when, if ever, will current incentives decline because of a newuse technology? By assuming that current incentives are at the "right" level
to start with, if we can determine a point at which they decline from that
level, then we have determined the point at which incentives need to be
added to bring authorial creativity back up to the "right" level.
In short, we can focus on displacement: will a new-use technology
eventually displace existing uses of copyrighted works-the uses that do
generate royalty income and hence provide a present incentive? If the newuse industry ends up displacing present forms of copyright exploitation, then
works would impose costs on users without any countervailing benefits to society") /d.
(footnotes omitted); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR.
L. REv. 19, 31-32 n.43 (1996) (stating "it is conventional to argue that copyright holders
should receive only such incentives as are necessary to impel them to create and disseminate
new works") (citation omitted); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600,
1610 (1982) (stating "[c]opyright ... create[s] ownership rights in intellectual property, with
the primary goal of generating monetary incentives for the production of creative works").

1999]

Hardy

693

a new incentive in the form of royalties from the new industry's use will be
needed. If it does not ever displace present-day forms of exploitation, then a
new incentive will not be needed.
The problem, of course, is that without foresight, neither Congress nor
the courts can know which growth path a new-use industry is likely to
follow. Will the new-use remain forever an aside to some existing market,
150
potentially only a minor source of income to copyright owners because the
primary sources are not displaced; or will it outgrow and dominate that
existing market, displacing it to become a major source of income for
copyright owners; or something in between?
The short and accurate answer is "no one knows." But this situation is a
classic case of the need for a decision maker - court or Congress - to
make decisions under uncertainty; techniques exist to help us in that
effort. The decision maker will be faced with what statisticians call "Type I
151
The labels themselves mean nothing and provide no
and Type II'' errors.
useful insights into the problem, but they do constitute a kind of shorthand
that makes further discussion a bit more convenient. The terms are used
here solely for that reason. A Type I error means that a decision was made
to do something that need not or should not have been done. A Type ll error
means that a decision to do something was not made, but should have been.
In the context of technologies that allow new uses of copyrighted
works, that cryptic summary means this. A Type I error would be committed
if a decision-maker decided to impose royalty obligations on a new-use
industry when royalty payments were unnecessary because the industry was
destined to remain only marginally important to copyright owners. A Type
ll error would be committed if the decision-maker concluded that the newuse industry should not be required to pay royalties, and yet the industry was
destined to become a major market for copyright owners.
One way to address the problem of uncertainty in this copyright context
is to ask which of these two errors is the more likely and the more serious;
other things being equal, if one error is both more likely and more serious
than other errors, then that error should be avoided. That is, if one error is
likely to bring about a greater harm to the public than the other, and the
decision maker has no independent reason to pick one outcome over the
other, then the error most likely to cause the greatest harm should be
avoided. The question of infringement for new uses of existing copyrighted
works therefore reduces itself to an inquiry as to which harm is likely to be
greater, a Type I or a Type ll error.
150. The new-use is only "potentially'' a source of income because whether it is or is
not an actual source depends on how the copyright issues are decided.
151. See, e.g., MICHAEL 0. FINKElSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS
124-26 (1990).
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Type I Errors

A Type I error means that a decision is made that the new-use is an
infringement, and consequently that the copyright owner has a right to
demand royalties, even though it will eventually prove to be the case that the
new-use industry does not become a significant market for copyright
owners. What is the harm from that outcome?
Two related harms seem possible. First is that a requirement to make
royalty payments may be enough to stifle the new-use industry, leaving it to
founder when it might have survived, or perhaps leaving it weakened,
amounting to less than it might have amounted. We might call this a Type Ia
error-again, only for convenience; there is no special magic in labels. This
possibility of this type of error has been indirectly noted in academic
literature. Professor Jessica Litman has written about the many new
technologies that have not been required to pay royalties, but instead have
been allowed to grow up in the "shelter of a copyright exemption." 152 This
view, that being sheltered from royalty obligations fosters and promotes the
growth of desirable new industries, implies the contrary: that if these newuse industries had been obligated to pay royalties, they would have been
stifled or suppressed 153-and that would be what this article terms a Type Ia,
or "suppression" error.
Perhaps worse, a second type of harm from Type I errors would arise if
copyright owners were content with their own system of exploiting
copyrighted works and simply did not want any competition from new
uses. They might therefore deny a license to the new industry even if the
industry were willing and could afford to pay a suitable royalty. We can call
this a Type Ib, or "status quo" error, implying that the existing copyright
owners and copyright industries are happy with the status ~uo and simply do
not care to authorize a change by licensing any new uses. 15

152. Litman, supra note 149, at 29 n.33; see generally id. at 27 (stating "copyright
shelters and exemptions have, historically, encouraged rapid investment and growth in new
media of expression").
153. Accord Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 166 (1975)
(Biackmun, J., concurring) (stating "I had hoped, secondarily, that the reasoning of
Fortnightly and Teleprompter would be limited to CATV. At least in that context the two
decisions had the arguably desirable effect of protecting an infant industry from a premature
death") (emphasis added).
154. Litman, supra note 149, at 25 (stating "[m]ost [current copyright stakeholders]
would prefer that the new copyright rules for new copyright-affecting technologies be
designed to enable current stakeholders to retain their dominance in the marketplace")
(footnotes omitted).
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Type II Errors

A Type II error means that a decision is made that the new-use is not an
infringement, even though the industry is destined to become potentially a
major source of income to copyright owners. What is the harm here?
Most obviously, the harm is that the lack of royalties from the new
industry will mean a significant disincentive for authors as the old royalty
paying industry gradually shrinks in importance. In that event, the public
will lose the benefit of whatever a greater incentive might have brought.
Let us take the phonograph record industry as an example. In the early
days of the industry, the incentives for the creation of musical compositions
came almost entirely from the sale of sheet music, which dominated the
155
market for music in the home.
Yet eventually the phonograph recording
industry grew enormous!~ more important in sales and dollar volume than
56
the sheet music industry.
Had the recording industry been exempt from
royalty payments, for example, it is most unlikely that composers' income
from the sale of sheet music would have continued to this day to induce the
creation of the socially desirable amount of music.
C.

Which Harm is Greater?

So which harm is the greater, a "Type r· or a ''Type II'' error? The first
harm from a Type Ia error is that a new-use industry might be suppressed or
weakened by the obligation to pay royalties. That is only a harm, though, if
the public would have derived greater total benefits from the new industry's
presence and strength than its absence-that is, if the new-use industry had
survived and all other things had been equal.
Manifestly, however, all other things would not be equal. In particular,
authors unable to derive revenue from the new-use of their works are worse
off than they would be if they were able to derive revenue. In a rough sense,
what the new-use industry gains by not having to pay royalties is offset by
what authors lose by not receiving royalties. 157 Conversely, under the
opposite copyright liability regime (one of full liability), the new royalty
revenues that authors can command from the new-use are offset by the
corresponding increased royalty costs for the new industry.
In short, we want to maximize the benefits-less the costs-of both old
and new uses of copyrighted works. A new-use industry strengthened means
155. See supra text accompanying note 70.
156. See FEIST, supra note 82 and accompanying quotation. See also the phonograph
company earnings figures listed supra note 72.
157. The trade-off will not necessarily be one for one: not all authors entitled to
demand royalties would demand them, or demand as much as they might.

696

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 23:657

an old use industry weakened. And vice versa. Unless one is committed to
the proposition that new things are ipso facto superior to old things, 158 one
cannot say that the stifling of a new-use industry is necessarily bad. So the
question of the Type I error becomes not just "was the new-use industry
stifled or weakened," but more precisely "was the new-use industry stifled or
weakened inappropriately, i.e., to the public's overall detriment?"
How might the "stifling of an industry to the public's detriment"
happen? Start with this assumption: Apart from the royalties question, the
new-use industry would have to bring benefits greater than its costs to
survive in any event. If it did not earn a profit, it would fail to survive in the
marketplace. Absent some sort of larger market failure, 159 an individual
business's or industry's failure would be a socially useful result because it
would free up resources to be used in more socially desirable ways. If a
new-use industry brought so little value to the public that it was destined to
fail even without paying royalties, then the requirement of paying royalties
might hasten its demise-and that would be a good thing.
On the other hand, if the new-use industry were so socially beneficial
that it was destined to earn substantial profits, then an obligation to pay
royalties within some reasonable range would not be enough to stifle it. At
least we know that an obligation to pay royalties does not necessarily
prevent an industry from growing-both radio and television, and for that
matter, motion pictures, 160 have grown up under such royalty obligations.
We come to an important conclusion. Whether a new-use industry is
obliged to pay royalties or not makes the most difference when that new
158. Cf. Litman, supra note 149, at 27, where Professor Litman appears to hold the
view that new is ipso facto better than old. (stating "[suppose] we imagined the viewpoint of
a hypothetical benevolent despot with the goal of promoting exciting new technology"). /d.
(emphasis added).
159. "Larger market failure" implies some sort of externality. Pollution is the classic
negative externality: something that affects others but with effects that are not captured in a
marketplace transaction and hence not reflected in the price of polluting company's
product. A firm with uncorrected negative externalities imposes costs on others that the firm
does not have to bear; that means that the firm might succeed when it "ought" to fail. A firm
might also generate "positive externalities," or benefits provided to others that the firm cannot
capture through appropriate pricing of its products. For example, a firm that designed
especially good looking Internet sites might find their sites used as "teaching aids" or models
for emulation by aspiring Internet page designers. To the extent that the aspiring designers do
not themselves pay for the "instruction" they receive from studying the firm's site designs, the
firm has conferred external benefits on those designers.
160. See Kalem II, 222 U.S. at 62 (1911) (stating that a motion picture made from a
novel infringes the novel owner's right to control dramatizations of the novel, even though the
right of "dramatization" in the statute was enacted at a time before the development of motion
pictures when stage plays were all that was expressly contemplated).
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industry is barely profitable. And-again, absent market failures-an
industry that is barely profitable is one that makes a comparably small
contribution to society. Finally, that conclusion leads us to a useful rule of
thumb: If a decision maker makes a Type Ia error, fmding infringement
liability where the industry is of only slight significance and consequently
for which the obligation to pay royalties is likely to be a significant factor in
causing the industry to fail, the magnitude of the error is likely to be quite
small.
Now we must address the second type of harm, a Type Ib error:
Congress or courts impose infringement liability and a corresponding
obligation to pay royalties in a situation in which authors will refuse to
license the new-use in order to preserve their existing business. For industries destined to fail for want of providing any significant public value, we
are no worse off if copyright owners refuse a license. By hypothesis, a
copyright owner's refusal to permit licensing merely hastens the demise of
an nonbeneficial industry, a socially desirable outcome. But for those newuse industries that might have provided significant value to society, a
copyright owner's refusal to license would presumably put the new-use
industry out of business, and that would be harmful to the public.
Is this outcome likely in practice? Do authors (copyright owners)
actually refuse to license uses of their works when it would be profitable for
them to do so? Of course, anything can happen. People can be motivated by
"irrational" forces: anger, spite, etc. But in the main, one would expect that
if authors can make money by licensing, they wi11. 161 It is in their selfinterest to do so. In other words, the likelihood that authors given both a
right and a market that permits them to 'demand royalties in some profitable
amount, would instead refuse royalties in any amount, seems small-far less
than the likelihood that they would happily receive them. At the very least,
if one has to make rules that govern most situations, most of the time, one is
more likely to be right if one predicts that when money can be made, the
people in a position to make it will try to make it.

161. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 316 (5th ed. 1998) (stating
in relation to patents that "it is always more profitable to license production to a more efficient
pr!)ducer than it is to produce oneself'); ARMEN A. ALcHIAN & WILLIAM R. AllEN, EXCHANGE
AND PRODUCTION: COMPEITTION, COORDINATION, & CONTROL 292 (3d ed. 1983) (describing
in relation to patents the fallacy of "a commonplace of modem folklore that gasoline
producers have a new fuel or carburetor that would enormously reduce the demand for
gasoline, but to protect their wealth they have withheld the device"); ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND EcoNOMICS 138 (1988) (referring to patents: "[T]he use of a patent
to suppress an invention is exceedingly unlikely. The far more common case is that the
licensing of a patent for a fee is much more valuable to the patentee than is the act of not
revealing an invention").
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Summing up, we can see that the harm from a Type Ib error is
significant, but the likelihood that such an error will be made-in which a
new-use industry would have prospered, to the public's overall benefit, but
the relevant authors refused, on economically irrational grounds, to grant a
license for that use-is low. 162

D.

Type II Errors

A Type IT error means that the new-use industry is found not to infringe
but is destined to grow in importance to the point that the industry's failure
to pay royalties will constitute a significant disincentive to authors. What is
the harm here?
The obvious harm is that with inadequate incentives, authors create (or
publishers publish, or distributors distribute, etc.) less than they might have
and the public is worse off as a result. Is that a likely harm? Surprisingly,
we have no examples of an important industry that was held to have no
royalty obligations and for which the lack of obligation persisted throughout
the industry's history. The examples that would likely have fit that pattern
all ended up eventually with some form of royalty obligation, frequently in
the form of a compulsory license. The phonograph and cable television
certainly fit this model, as did the jukebox until 1993. 163
One might question, then, whether there is any harm at all when a court
declines to impose infringement liability and hence a royalty obligation on a
new-use industry. If the industry is destined to remain of little public
benefit, then the loss of its royalties to authors will not be significant. Yet, if
the industry does become important, then Congress will act to impose
compulsory license royalties. That has at least been something of the
historical pattern.
The problem with this reasoning is that it assumes two things: first, that
the royalty obligation (again, typically in the form of a compulsory license)
will be imposed at about the same time as the industry becomes significant
enough to justify the requirement and not earlier or later; and second, that
compulsory licenses-if that is the mechanism-are a desirable way to
accommodate the royalty obligation. The evidence to date suggests that the
162. One counterargument is that we do not care about "authors" literally. It is the old
use industry that matters, the industry that is not an "author" itself but a licensee of
authors. The counterargument fails, however: New authors arise all the time and have the
option to transfer their rights to old or new-use industries. To the extent that the old use
industry is itself the "author" of the works its sells, then the argument in the text holds
directly.
163. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (Supp. 1995) (phonorecords); 17 U.S.C. § 11l(c), (d) (1994)
(cable television); 17 U.S.C. § 116(b) (1988), repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-198, § 3(a), (b)(2), 107 Stat. 2309.
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first assumption is questionable and that the second is correct only as a
matter of politics, but certainly incorrect as a matter of economics.
The first assumption is that a decision to impose infringement liability
on a new-use industry will not just happen eventually, but will happen at
roughly the "right" time. The "right" time is the time that the need for an
incentive to authors arises. If the obligation is imposed later than that, then
the public will be the poorer for the delay; moreoveu a belated imposition of
royalties will almost certainly not be retroactive, 1 so that the loss to the
public is one that can never be repaid. When exactly that time first arises is
obviously a difficult question to answer. Certainly authors and the new-use
industry would not agree on the matter: Authors are likely to believe that the
"right" time for royalty payments is from the beginning, whenever the newuse first arose; the new-use industry is likely to believe that the right time is
"never."
The very difficulty of determining objectively when the right time
arises, coupled with a strong self-interest on both sides that effectively
prevents them from having an objective view at all, implies that there is little
or no incentive in either the legislative or judicial arenas for decision makers
to discover what the "right" time is for the imposition of a royalty
obligation. That is, no one in a position to take action-the parties, the
courts, or Congress-stands to gain by trying to determine the right time for
royalty imposition. Consequently, one must conclude that when
infringement liability and a royalty obligation is belatedly imposed on a newuse industry, the assumption that this imposition will come at the "right
time" is probably wrong. At the very least, we can say that there is no builtin incentive for the assumption to be true and hence, no reason to expect the
timing to be "right."
The point about economics-that compulsory licenses are wasteful of
resources-is easier to demonstrate. A compulsory license is a form of price
fixing: Congress or an agency sets the price for a broad class of
bargains 165-those that deal with the buying and selling of certain copyright
164. A retroactive imposition of liability would mean this: First, a new-use industry is
found (by a court or Congress) not to infringe some existing works; second, the new-use
industry grows in importance to the point that the lack of royalty payments becomes a
significant disincentive to authors; third, a decision is made (by court or Congress) that the
new-use industry should pay royalties; and finally, the decision maker extends this new
royalty obligation to past acts that have already been determined not to infringe. This last step
seems very likely to be a denial of due process and hence unconstitutional.
165. For example, for pre-1998 transactions, the license to record a musical
composition that has already been recorded is set in the statute at "either two and three-fourths
cents, or one-half of one cent per minute of playing time or fraction thereof, whichever
amount is larger." 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(2) (1994). After 1998, the decision maker shifts from
Congress to the Copyright Office, which has acquired the authority to establish license prices
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licenses; the parties have little or no room to change the price term. 166 As
such, a compulsory license has whatever drawbacks price controls
167
have. Absent significant market failures, a compulsory license makes for
a wasteful allocation of social resources. 168
Compulsory licenses might be justified on two other grounds,
however. First, that such a license can reflect a Congressional policy
determination simply to favor one industry or activity over another. For
example, Congress might decide to favor cable television with compulsory
license payments that were lower than fair market value precisely to foster
the growth of cable at the expense of other activities. Whether this is a
desirable way to create subsidies instead of alternatives like tax deductions
or outright subsidy payments from general tax revenues is partly a matter of
politics and political philosophy.
In addition, there is a possibility that a compulsory license will lower
transaction costs. This is at times offered as a justification for such
169
licenses, but this point is misleading at best. Other things being equal,
under 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-803 (1994). In the case of cable royalties, the price is based on a
station's annual revenue and determined from a complex series of conditions. See 17 U.S.C. §
111(d) (1994).
166. Under many copyright compulsory license provisions, the statutorily specified
price serves as a ceiling; the parties may reach agreement for a lower price. See, e.g., 17
U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(B) (Supp. II 1997) (stating "copyright owners of nondramatic musical
works and any persons entitled to obtain a compulsory license [for cover records] ... may
negotiate and agree upon the terms and rates of royalty payments"); 17 U.S.C. § 118(b) (1994)
(stating that owners of copyright in certain musical and other works and "any public
broadcasting entities, respectively, may negotiate and agree upon the terms and rates of royalty
payments"). From early on, lesser-known music recordings "covered" by better-known artists
have in fact received less than the statutory royalty. See SEGRAVE, supra note 70, at 18, 20.
167. See supra text accompanying note 159.
168. See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable
Television, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 77-79 (1981); ALcHIAN & All..EN, supra note
161, at 62. Note that by hypothesis I am describing a new-use industry that has grown to the
point where royalties from an "old use" industry have fallen off significantly; consequently, I
am describing a situation for which a royalty obligation from the new-use industry is
consistent with overall reliance on copyright as an incentive for the public's benefit. One can
always assert that Congress is free to deny copyright to any activity and that it can certainly
extend a limited copyright in the form of compulsory licenses to any activity as well. I do not
gainsay that point; I am not talking about Congressional power but rather about a situation in
which anyone who agreed with the fundamental principles of copyright-an incentive for
creation that redounds to the public's benefit-would agree that a royalty is called for.
169. Transaction costs were offered as the reason for a statutorily specified compulsory
license for cable television in the 1976 Copyright Act: "[I]t would be impractical and unduly
burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose
work was retransmitted by a cable system." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 89 (1976).

1999]

Hardy

701

price fixing always lowers transaction costs because it avoids the need for
bargaining. If that were a suitable justification in general, then Congress
ought to establish prices for every transaction in every market, copyright or
otherwise. That Congress has never systematically attempted to fix the
prices of all goods and services in the United States marketplace suggests
that the transaction cost rationale alone must not in fact be a helpful
170
explanation for the existence of compulsory licenses.
In any event, there is no evidence in our recent compulsory license
. .
&
• k b
. . 172 ph onograph
provisions
sueh as 10r
JU
e oxes, 171 cable te1evision
1
173
174
recording, public broadcasting, satellite transmissions, 75 and others that
social welfare is improved by that mechanism. 176 Whereas there is reason to
think that the fair use provision-itself a kind of compulsory license that
operates in situations with additional indications of public benefitaccomplishes overall socially desirable objectives. 177
Economics aside, it appears that the large number of compulsory
licenses in copyright law is based on the fact that politically, the compulsory
license makes a great deal of sense. When a Type IT error is made early on,
and an industry prospers without liability that should, at some point, be
obliged to pay royalties, it is politically difficult-perhaps impossible-for
Congress to switch the industry "cold turkey" from no liability to full
liability. Nor would that switch be fair to the industry which, after all, has
relied for its investments on a past decision that its actions did not constitute

170. See also Hardy II, supra note 112, at 446 (stating "[a] reduction in transaction
costs through legislation is beneficial only if all sides benefit from the reduction. If one side
benefits but only to the corresponding detriment of the other side, then Congress has merely
shifted resources from one side to the other by a form of price-fixing").
171. 17 U.S.C. § 116(a) (1988), repealed by Copyright Royalty Reform Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-198 § 3, 107 Stat. 2309 (1993).
172. 17 u.s.c. § 111(d)(1994).
173. /d. at§ 115.
174. !d. at§ 118(b)(3).
175. /d. at§ 119.
176. Compulsory licensing may at times have even more pernicious and unexpected
consequences than a simple failure to promote the general welfare. The compulsory licensing
of recorded music, for example, which takes the form of allowing the making of "cover
records" without permission, has been said to have encouraged both racism and payola. See
SEGRAVE, supra note 70, at 18-19 (stating the compulsory licensing of cover records allowed:
"racism to be more prevalent, especially noticeable in the 1950s when racist radio stations
refused to play, for example, Little Richard, substituting instead a white cover by Pat
Boone. [The presence of multiple versions of the same song in] tum has put more pressure on
companies to dispense payola").
177. See Gordon, supra note 149, at 1602.
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178

A compulsory license, then, is often the only compromise
infringement.
that can be reached at that stage in the growth of the new-use industry. 179
Finally, whenever a decision about infringement liability reaches
Congress, one expects a fair amount of lobbying and arguing about the
outcome. The 1909 Copyright Act hearings, for example, were full of
witnesses and leng.hy testimony about the issue of phonograph recordings
1
and piano rolls.
The issue of cable television's copyright liability
consumed a substantial amount of debate during the 1976 Copyright Act
revision process-as, for that matter, did nearly every issue! 181 In a sense,
whenever an important issue like cable television or recorded sound S"!Jrfaces
in Congress during a revision effort, substantial "transaction costs" are
entailed in lobbying and testifying.
The cost of a Type II error, in sum, consists of three parts. First is the
cost of the public's loss of access to creative expression during the period in
which the new-use industry should have been paying royalties. 182 Second,
there is the cost of a compulsory license, which is essentially the waste of

178. For example, see the 1908 arguments of counsel for the Apollo Company (piano
roll manufacturer), Charles S. Burton and John J. O'Connell, that past court decisions holding
piano rolls not to infringe musical compositions constituted "prior decisions [that] have
established a rule of property and of business, and should be sustained under the doctrine of
stare decisis, unless greater injury would result from sustaining than from reversing them."
White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. I, 7 (1908) (emphasis added);
Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong.
(1906), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part J at 289 (statement of FrankL. Dyer, of
the Edison Manufacturing Company and National Phonograph Company) (stating
I submit, gentlemen, that a radical change in the law would seriously disturb
vested interests which have enormously developed under the present
law. The National Phonograph [company] has a pay roll of over $45,000 per
week, over 4,000 employees, and makes over 100,000 records and 1,500
machines daily .... The business has developed under the security of the
present law ....).
179. For useful exposition of the events behind the adoption of the compulsory license
provision for cable television in the 1979 Copyright Act, see Litman, supra note 7, at 32632. See also Darlene A. Cote, Note, Chipping Away at the Copyright Owner's Rights:
Congress' Continued Reliance on the Compulsory License, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219 (1994).
180. See generally Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1994)).
181. See Litman, supra note 132, at 857.
182. I apologize for possibly beating a dead horse, but once again I remind the reader
that I am talking here about an industry that "should have been paying royalties" because, by
hypothesis, the industry has grown to the point that its failure to pay royalties constitutes a
significant loss of incentives to authors and therefore, a loss to the public.
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resources inherent in any price fixing arrangement. 183 And fmally, there is
the cost of the decision making process when authors line up against a newuse industry during the process of copyright revision. These include:
lobbying costs, publicity campaigns, time consumed in Congressional
hearings by participants, time given up by members of Congress that might
have been applied to other issues, and whatever other expenses accompany a
major legislative battle between opposed industry groups. 184

E.

Type I and II Errors: Summary

We can chart the various errors and their harms. As is so often true
with copyright issues, assessments of the magnitude of harm and its
frequency from various courses of action are largely subjective; this article
makes no claim otherwise. With the subjective nature of the following
assessments taken into account, on balance, we have something like this
chart:
Error type
Typela
Typelb
Type II

Likely frequency
?
low
high

Likely harm
insubstantial
substantial
substantial ·

Unless the expected frequency of Type Ia errors is extremely high, the
greatest expected harm from wrong decisions about the infringement liability
of new-use industries is that of a Type II error. That is, the error we should
be concerned to avoid is that of failing to impose infringement liability on
the new-use industry. In turn, this means that-all other things being equal,
and there being no other basis for a decision-the decision maker faced with
deciding whether a new-use industry should be obliged to pay royalties will
more likely be right when deciding "yes" than "no."
The history of various new technologies sketched out in this article
tends to confirm this general rule of thumb. The technologies discussed here
183. There is no requirement that the imposition of a belated royalty obligation take the
form of a compulsory license with its inefficiencies. It is just that as a practical matter, that
seems to be the usual course for Congress to take because it reflects a political
compromise. Note also that one may choose to put a high value on government decision
making such as price controls for its own sake. From that perspective, the "cost" of a
compulsory license in poorly allocated resources may perhaps be offset by whatever "gain"
inheres in the fact that a resource allocation decision was made by Congress rather than
privately.
184. See generally Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U.
Cm. LEGAL F. 217,252-58 (1996).
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that grew to enormous significance in American life have included the
phonograph and subsequent mechanisms for recording sounds, motion
pictures, radio, television, cable television, and the Internet. Motion
pictures, radio, and television were new-use technologies that were subject
to the usual copyright royalty obligations from the start. All have prospered
nonetheless. Recorded sound and cable television were not subject to such
obligations and have evolved under complex and economically wasteful
compulsory license provisions that have long since outlasted any
conceivable justification other than the inertia of the status quo. Though
anything is possible, one would be hard-pressed to conclude that either of
these latter technologies would have suffered a premature death under
copyright's usual royalty regime.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with this analysis, at the very least the
analysis shows what the relevant inquiry is. In particular, the relevant
inquiry is not merely looking at the new-use industry and its current financial
health alone, without considering the effects on the old use industries, and
without taking into account the various possibilities for the new-use
industry's future growth. Proper decision making about copyright's
application to new-use technologies requires instead an inquiry into the
future growth possibilities of the new-use industry and the potential for its
negative effect on existing copyright using industries.
VI. CONCLUSION
Copyright law seems never to be caught up with technology, with the
result that Congress is under constant pressure to amend the Copyright Act
to bring the law up to date with new developments. At first blush, this need
for continual amendment is puzzling: Congress expressly tried to make the
last major revision of copyright laws, adopted in 1976, flexible enough to
handle future technologies without need for frequent changes. A closer look
reveals, however, that Congress only solved one of at least four issues that
almost invariably arise with new technologies.
Looking back at technological developments over the last century that
include photography, piano rolls, phonograph recording, motion pictures,
radio, television, cable television, and the Internet, we can see copyright
issues emerging in four recognizable patterns: 1) the question of subject
matter coverage for new media of fixation; 2) the question of subject matter
coverage for new types of works; 3) the question of decentralized
infringement; and finally 4) the question of new uses of existing copyrighted
works.
We also see a checkered history of courts' and Congress's accommodation to these four issues, with the most success accruing to the first
issue, that of new media of fixation. By and large, the cprrent Copyright
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Act's focus on intangible "works" as copyright's subject matter reasonably
well handles new developments in media of expression such as laser disks or
the like.
The other issues remain far more problematic. One of the most
intriguing is the last, that of a new technology that creates a new way of
using existing copyright works. Frequently, courts and Congress have
viewed this new-use issue in the wrong light. By focusing on the industries
and technologies prominent at the time the new-use issue first arises,
copyright decision makers have tended to assess the royalty obligations of
the new-use by examining the new technology's effects on existing
uses. Thus in hearings on the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress clung doggedly
to the argument that phonograph records would only enhance the "real"
market, the market for sheet music. 185 Radio broadcasters in the 1920s
argued that radio only enhanced that same market. The Supreme Court in
the 1970s was strongly swayed by the view that cable television was merely
an enhancement to the "real" market, the market for broadcast television.
In none of these cases did the decision maker focus on the more
important question: Will the new-use industry eventually grow to displace
today's technologies for exploiting copyrighted material? For if that
displacement occurs, then authorial incentives will decline unless offset by a
new royalty stream from the new-use technology. Given that no one can
predict the future growth of today's technology, copyright decision makers
should rely instead on an analysis that looks at this question: How bad could
it be if the decision maker guesses wrongly about the growth of a new-use
technology? By using the statistical concept of ''Type r• and ''Type ll''
errors, this article concludes that, other things being equal, copyright
decision makers ought to resolve the issue of copyright royalty obligations
arising from uncertainty about the future of a new-use technology by
deciding in favor of royalty obligations.

185. See generally Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1994)).

